Indira’s War, Modi’s Truce: What Changed Between 1971 and Operation Sindoor

The young generations must be told about how Indira Gandhi led India in 1971 with matchless courage and diplomacy.

One of the major factors that led to the spectacular success of the Bangladesh Liberation War was the way that Indira Gandhi and her advisors conducted the country's foreign policy after the crisis erupted in the spring of 1971.

(Photo: Aroop Mishra/The Quint)

Two news reports on the front pages of print media a few days back caught the attention of the readers. Both were based on public statements made by the Indian prime minister and the US president, respectively.

The first was by Narendra Modi, who, in his broadcast to the nation, attributed the ceasefire to India's decision to suspend its operations after Pakistan's military reached out to India's DGMO "after suffering severe losses." The other report, meanwhile, was a statement by Donald Trump saying that his strategy had worked and that "the US had brokered permanent truce."

It obviously meant that India, much against public opinion, acted under American pressure. This, at a time when the government was claiming it had succeeded in substantially destroying Pakistan's terror infrastructure, "Its precision strikes had destroyed their air bases," and that "the sky is ours."

Trump repeated his assertion in Riyadh next day while on a visit to Saudi Arabia this week, saying, once again, that he "brokered ceasefire."

A Leadership Remembered

When the ceasefire was announced, social media was flooded with images of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi highlighting her courageous leadership in the 1971 war.

One video, for instance, showed her press conference soon after the victory, with the text, "The aura, the charm and the confidence – Indira Gandhi is missed today by crores of Indians. Such leadership is born once in 100 years."

Over 53 years have passed since the Liberation of Bangladesh on 16 December 1971, which resulted from India's greatest ever military victory in its history. The young generations must be told about the saga of Indira Gandhi and how she led India in 1971 with matchless courage, wisdom, and diplomacy.

The Lightning Campaign by Major General DK Palit, Vir Chakra (retd), is perhaps the very first book on the India-Pakistan War of 1971, published as early as January 1972, within less than two months of the culmination of the war. In this book, the author writes:

"The firm and confident handling of the problem by Gandhi and her government was matched by the sophisticated management, direction, and leadership of the Indian armed forces. In spite of the Indian reluctance to be the first to aggress, Gandhi firmly retained the initiative for military action in the east and played the game of conflict control with consummate skill to gain advantage in the border confrontation in Bangladesh."

Major General DK Palit in 'The Lightning Campaign'

One of the major factors that led to the spectacular success of the Bangladesh Liberation War was the way that Indira Gandhi and her advisors conducted the country's foreign policy after the crisis erupted in the spring of 1971.

As Pakistani atrocities, beginning the night of 25-26 March 1971, mounted, there was a natural clamour of the Indian people for 'action’ which, in other words, meant military intervention, the outcry for which intensified as waves of refugees started pouring in soon after.

Global Diplomacy Under Fire

For the first few months, Gandhi had to repeatedly calm her people. She gently told Members of Parliament, "A wrong step, or even a wrong word, would have an effect different from the desired one."

She was determined not to be stampeded into doing anything that might lay India open to the charge of violating international law, or enable Pakistan to discredit the liberation struggle in Bangladesh as a conspiracy by India.

Inder Malhotra, one of her leading biographers, said:

"This was the first indication of the superb qualities of leadership Indira was to display, to the joy and pride of most Indians, all through the Bangladesh crisis and the 14-day India-Pakistan war. She won admiration for the skill with which she harmonised the military, political and diplomatic strands of the Indian response to the crisis next door. Deftly, she mastered the situation rather than allow it to overwhelm her."

Inder Malhotra

Addressing Parliament on 26 May, exactly two months after the genocide had begun, Gandhi stated, "It is a problem that threatens the peace and security of India and, indeed, of Southeast Asia. The world must intervene to see that peace and security are re-established and maintained."

But the world was slow to react. Many countries cited the clause of UN Charter that forbids member states from interference in the ‘internal affairs’ of another member country. In July 1971, US President Richard Nixon sent his emissary Henry Kissinger to talk to Indian leaders and let them know the stand of the US. He left no illusion in Gandhi's mind where the sympathies of the Nixon administration lay.

He made it clear to her and her Foreign Minister Swaran Singh that should China intervene on Pakistan's side in the event of an India-Pakistan war, India should expect no help from the US. But he cleverly hid the fact that he was going to visit China a few days later, to pave the way for the visit of Nixon to a country which the Americans had not even recognised for the last two decades and more.

Soon, it was publicly known that Kissinger had visited China with the help of Pakistan, which offered its military airfield for his aircraft to take off from its territory. The American ‘tilt’ towards Pakistan could not have been more brazen. Even the Chinese leaders were openly supporting Yahya Khan and accusing India of 'helping secessionist Bangladeshis'.

The Soviet Embrace: A Strategic Masterstroke

It was under these circumstances that Gandhi came to the conclusion that India needed some sort of a shield to protect her. That was when she decided to finalise a long-pending treaty with Soviet Russia.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed on behalf of both countries by their foreign ministers, Swaran Singh and Andrei Gromyko, in New Delhi on 9 August, and made public the same day at a mass rally in Delhi's Ramlila Maidan.

The treaty, first offered by the Soviet Union to India in 1969, had then received only a lukewarm response from New Delhi, due to both domestic and foreign policy concerns. But the far-sighted PM felt that the time was ripe for signing the treaty.

Some of her aides, such as DP Dhar and PN Haksar, ensured that it was negotiated with urgency and in total secrecy, till made public. This took care of the threat from both America and China.

The Washington Standoff: Indira vs Nixon

Having achieved a major deterrence and leaving the service chiefs to plan their military strategies for both the eastern and the western fronts, Gandhi left on a tour to solicit international support for the cause of Bangladesh, and trigger action against Pakistan.

She visited the Soviet Union, Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, West Germany, and the US. In all the countries, except the US, she received an encouraging response in the form of financial and moral support for the refugees. Many other countries, not on her itinerary, were covered by the affable Swaran Singh who, with his long innings at the foreign office, made a convincing case for India in the world capitals.

However, it was Gandhi's meeting with President Nixon in Washington where she showed that India, the world's largest democracy, won't be cowed down by America, the world's most powerful democracy. According to Kissinger, "The Nixon-Gandhi conversation turned into a classic dialogue of the deaf."

Indira Gandhi refused to answer any questions raised by Nixon related to Indo-Pak dispute, and instead, changed the topic to Vietnam much to annoyance of the US President.

When she found the President totally tilted towards Pakistan, Gandhi more than made up for it by appealing directly to the American public and legislators who, like Senator Edward Kennedy and William Saxbe, had visited India and seen for themselves the pitiable plight of refugees, by now 10 million.

But the Indo-Soviet Treaty and her faith in the might of the Indian military had given Indira Gandhi the confidence to face the challenge before her with supreme courage and poise.

Victory in the East, Statesmanship in the West

When towards the last stage of the war, Nixon ordered the American Seventh Fleet to set sail for the Bay of Bengal, India's 'Iron Lady' told Sam Manekshaw to direct the Eastern Command to speed up operations. While the Seventh Fleet was 36 hours of sailing time from the Bay of Bengal, she chose to address a public meeting at Ramlila Maidan.

As recorded, Indian fighter planes circled overhead to ensure that a sudden attack by the Pakistan Air Force from the west did not threaten the gathering. She had been advised to speak over the air, but she was insistent on appearing in public... Her voice rose to a crescendo: "We will not retreat. Not by a single step will we move back." If the presence of the Seventh Fleet was meant to unnerve Indira Gandhi and the Indian people, the strategy failed. The country rallied behind her.

In fact, Nixon's strategy backfired. The US press accused him of forcing India into the Soviet camp. Nixon and his advisors were taken by surprise.

A frustrated Kissinger told the State Department: "Go and ask the President, don't ask me and don't tell me that we are throwing India into the lap of the Soviets. The lady is too tough to become anyone's stooge."

The Indian Army, actively assisted by Mukti Bahini, virtually ran through East Bengal and reached Dhaka, where on 16 December at 4:30 pm, a defeated and demoralised Pakistan Army surrendered with 93,000 soldiers before Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora, the Eastern Army Commander. Before the Seventh Fleet entered the Indian waters, the war was over.

After the Pakistan Army surrendered, Yahya Khan made a broadcast to his people that the war would go on. But the foresighted Gandhi had no intention of doing so. The mission of liberating Bangladesh had been accomplished and continuing the war in the west would have meant more destruction and suffering.

So, in an act of highest statesmanship, she announced in Parliament that the Indian Defence Forces had been given orders to ceasefire with effect from 8 pm on 17 December.

It was not unnatural for some sections to suspect that India may have acted under pressure to declare unilateral ceasefire. To such people, Army Chief Field Marshal (then General) Sam Manekshaw replied, "I can't believe that any country can put pressure on Indira Gandhi."

(Praveen Davar is the ex-secretary of All India Congress Committee (AICC), ex-Army officer, a columnist and the author of 'Freedom Struggle and Beyond'. This is an opinion article, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)