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A major problem with assessing Operation Sindoor is the paucity of information released by the contending parties and the cloud of disinformation that has made it difficult to separate fact from fiction.
India, for example, has not confirmed or denied the losses of fighter aircraft it suffered on the first day of the operation. As for Pakistan, it has not acknowledged the damage its airbases suffered in India’s followup attacks on 9 and 10 May. Satellite imagery has helped confirm the damage on Pakistan, but it does not provide proof of Pakistani claims of shooting down several Indian aircraft.
Take, for example, the use of the Chinese PL-15 missiles mounted on the Chinese J10CE fighters to bring down Indian aircraft. India itself was the first to provide evidence of the use of one such missile whose wreckage was presented at a press conference on 12 May. Claims of its efficacy came from Pakistan and various OSINT handles.
Actually, the first claim that China was a critical link in the long-range kill of the PL-15 missile was by Maj Gen Ashok Kumar, director general of the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), a think tank linked to the Integrated Defence Staff, who asserted that China had provided Pakistan with real-time satellite support and helped reorganise their radar and air defense systems (which included the Saab Erieye AWACS network). He was the first to suggest that the conflict was a "testing ground" where Chinese space assets were used to guide Pakistani kinetic strikes.
Pakistan has acknowledged using Chinese-supplied military hardware, including the J-10C fighter jets and PL-15 air-to-air missiles in the conflict. However, it did not confirm receiving satellite or radar assistance.
This led to a social media campaign to tout the Chinese weapons system asserting that they had been able to knock out India’s French-made Rafale fighters.
Western analysts suggested that the Chinese satellite inputs enabled Pakistani Erieye AWACS aircraft to guide PL-15s to Indian aircraft. Some of this found currency in a report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission who declared that “Pakistan’s military success over India in its four-day clash showcased Chinese weaponry.”
French intelligence sources said that China initiated a disinformation campaign to hinder sales of French Rafales in favour of its own J-35s, and it used fake social media accounts to propagate AI and video game images of supposed “debris” from the planes China’s weaponry destroyed.
On 4 July, the Indian Army Deputy Chief officially underlined Maj Gen Kumar’s assertions, and said China gave Islamabad “live inputs” on key Indian positions. Both China and Pakistan vehemently denied this.
A year after the war, the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) confirmed through an interview to the Chinese official channel CCTV that its personnel provided on-site technical support to the Pakistan Air Force.
According to the AVIC personnel, who were in Pakistan through the war, their job was to ensure that aircraft “performed at full combat potential” during the war. They were full of praise for the Chinese supplied J-10CE fighters that they were supporting.
At one level, it would appear that this is part of China’s efforts to hard-sell its J-10CE fighter, which is an export version of its J-10C multirole combat jet of which Pakistan is the only foreign operator as of now. The aircraft is equipped with AESA radar systems and carries long-range air-to-air missiles like the PL-15.
But there is a need to understand that Pakistan receives the bulk of its military equipment from China, and it is not surprising that its technicians are in Pakistan supporting their use. There are other Chinese systems in play like the BeiDou satellite navigation system, which can be used in place of GPS to guide weapons.
Pakistan is a primary partner of the BeiDou system and has signed an agreement with China that enables it to access the system’s restricted high precision military signal. The high precision signal is what allows Pakistani cruise missiles and advanced aircraft like the J-10C to achieve high accuracy strikes without relying on western infrastructure.
Perhaps, the most balanced assessment of Operation Sindoor has come from the Centre d’Histoire et de Prospective Militaries (CHPM) in Switzerland. In its January 2026 note, it says that the clash initially saw a clear tactical victory for Pakistan by shooting down several Indian fighters, but then it failed to conduct strikes over Indian territory because of the Indian integrated air defence system that proved to be surprisingly effective.
Thereafter, the Indian Air Force “managed to significantly degrade the enemy’s air defence system and then concluded the conflict by carrying out a series of spectacular strikes against Pakistan’s principal Air Force stations.”
This is in addition to the damage it inflicted on Pakistani ground facilities like control centres and air defence systems that were confirmed by satellite imagery.
Viewed in this perspective, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission report and Chinese claims do appear to be somewhat over the top. While the losses assessed by the CHPM appear fairly even, the Pakistan Air Force’s inability to challenge the Indian onslaught on the morning of 10 May suggested that continuing the conflict would have had drastic consequences for Pakistan.
(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. This is an opinion piece and views expressed are the author's own. The Quint does not endorse or is responsible for them.)
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