Trump Bets on Pakistan Again—But Who’s Playing Whom?

The US-Pakistan relationship is complex. It goes way beyond the asinine conspiracy theories of the media.

Donald Trump’s turnaround is reminiscent of the nature of US-Pakistan relationship—and to understand this complex relationship, one needs to look beyond the simplistic official explanations and asinine conspiracy theories of the media.

(Photo: The Quint)

Just hours after declaring a 25 percent tariff on India and an additional penalty for India's purchases of Russian military equipment and energy, US President Donald Trump announced that Washington has concluded a deal with Islamabad under which both countries will together develop Pakistan’s ‘massive oil reserves’, adding, 'maybe they’ll be selling oil to India some day'. A day later, the US sanctioned eight India-based companies.

Trump’s statement comes after claims of oil and gas finds in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and some offshore locations. As per the US Energy Information Administration, Pakistan has about 9 billion barrels of technically recoverable oil.

Pakistan claims to possess an estimated 235 trillion cubic feet of gas, 105 trillion cubic feet of recoverable shale gas, and nearly 9 billion barrels of recoverable shale-oil deposits. Whether all these can be extracted in a cost-effective manner remains to be seen.

US' Strategic Interest in Pakistan

Pakistan is geo-strategically located near the Gulf of Oman at the eastern edge of the ‘Islamic world’ (energy-rich Middle-East and energy- and resource-rich Africa), and at an intersection of many regions, countries, and cultures, including Iran, India, Afghanistan, Central Asia, China, Shiite Islam, Sunni Islam, and Hinduism.

While this mix makes Pakistan a major headache for its neighbours, it also means that great powers have a strategic interest in it.

Yet, Trump’s turnaround is reminiscent of the nature of US-Pakistan relationship—and to understand this complex relationship, one needs to look beyond the simplistic official explanations and asinine conspiracy theories of the media.

Over the past 78 years, the US policy toward Pakistan has swung between two extremes—enchantment or reprimand. The US has turned towards Pakistan in consonance with its strategic objectives in the broader region, and even when their individual strategic objectives diverged, Pakistan cleverly ensured that few critical segments of the US’s strategic interests were realised.

However, after that strategic objective was realised or waned, the US abandoned Pakistan—only to reach out again in wake of a new geo-strategic crisis.

Interestingly, a 2003-vintage US Department of Defense’s “Islamic Civilization Series Paper” entitled Contemporary Pakistan: Musharraf Era & US-Pak Strategic Relationship lists, inter alia, a deep-seated perception within the Pakistani establishment of the US being an ‘unreliable ally’.

First Crisis: Cold War

Towards the end of 1947, Pakistan had sought economic aid, but the US held off and instead reached out to India. The Indian leadership, having just got rid of one imperial power after 200 years, didn’t want to be beset by a new, stronger imperialistic power.

As India opted for ‘Non-Alignment’, the US, compelled by Cold War dynamics, opted for an alliance with Pakistan, leading to signing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (1954), and subsequent inclusion in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation.

In 1955, India opted for a strategic relationship with the USSR. This further cemented the US-Pakistan alliance. In 1959, both signed an Agreement of Cooperation, and Pakistan, termed as “America’s most allied ally in Asia”, began receiving significant amounts of advanced US military equipment. With deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s, China too saw the Indo-Soviet relationship as against it, and moved towards Pakistan.

Abandonment

The first cracks in the US-Pakistan relationship appeared during the 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict, when the US sanctioned both Pakistan and India. Pakistan accused the US of "not fulfilling its treaty obligations". It again complained to the US for "not aiding it meaningfully" in the 1971 War. Meanwhile, Pakistan had been working on a US-China reproachment.

The post-1972 Sino-US relationship also gave Pakistan the required headroom to further its own strategic relationship with China without antagonising the USA.

But Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons capability after the 1971 War led to fresh strains with the US, who suspended most aid to Pakistan in 1979 under the Symington Amendment.

Second Crisis: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

In December 1979, the USSR invaded Afghanistan, and the US swiftly waived the Symington sanctions, gave economic and military aid packages to Pakistan, and along with Saudi Arabia, bankrolled the ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan. Funds, arms, and equipment were funnelled through Pakistan to the mujahideen.

The latter, recruited through Pakistan, indoctrinated and trained in Pakistan as well as USA, and used Pakistan as a base. Pakistan exploited the situation to covertly pilfer aid and equipment, blackmail Washington into providing more assistance, and to further its interests in Afghanistan by strengthening selected Islamist groups.

Abandonment

The Symington Amendment had been waived for six years (1979-1985). So, to continue aid to Pakistan, the US Congress approved the Pressler Amendment. This required the US President to annually certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. US Presidents Reagan and Bush certified the same till the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.

In October 1990, President Bush declined to furnish the Pressler certification, and the US reimposed sanctions on Pakistan. However, by then, Pakistan had achieved two of its major foreign policy goals—influence in Afghanistan (mujahideen-turned-Taliban) and a nuclear weapons capability. The 1998 nuclear tests by Pakistan led to re-imposition of the Symington, Pressler, and Glenn Amendments by the US. The October 1999 military takeover by General Musharraf led to sanctions by the Commonwealth.

Third Crisis: 9/11 Attacks

A fresh crisis came to Pakistan’s rescue in September 2001. Post-9/11, the US could not have sustained the invasion of landlocked Afghanistan without wide-ranging Pakistani assistance. Pakistan quickly aligned with the US, provided port facilities, overland access, airfields, transportation, and some military-intelligence assistance.

In turn, the US promptly lifted all sanctions (nuclear-related on 22 September 2001 and democracy-related on 17 October 2001), and gave an Emergency Cash Transfer to help Pakistan tide over the fiscal crisis. It also designated Pakistan as a "Major Non-NATO Ally" in 2004. It also commenced economic, security, and military aid to Pakistan. Between 2002 and 2024, Pakistan received around $35 billion.

Abandonment

As US-China relations worsened, the US began fulsome engagement with the Quad. And the view of Islamabad being in Beijing’s ‘camp’ led to diminishing of the US-Pakistan security cooperation. The relationship waned further after the US’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.  

In sum: Pakistan’s key roles in the 1972 USA-China reproachment; in furthering the US’ aims of defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, which in turn contributed to the demise of the USSR and successful conclusion of the Cold War for the US; and then post-9/11 are assistive events which linger in the US government’s institutional memory. Pakistan is the only country in South Asia to provide military bases and assistance to the US in its fight against the Soviets and Sunni terrorists, the two main adversaries of the US since the Second World War.

Fourth Crisis: Present Time

A Russia-China-Iran-Pakistan nexus seems to be emerging from the US’ own trade-and-tariff wars; its aggressive stance on Taiwan, China, the Russia-Ukraine War; the Chinese operational assistance to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor; and the Israeli-US attacks on Iran.

The US is alarmed about this nexus as it could impinge on the flow of energy from the Caspian-Caucasus as well as affect the US’ access to Central Asia. In addition are the prospects of Afghanistan moving under Chinese influence. Besides, Israel’s barbarous destruction of Gaza has alienated nations like Saudi Arabia, even as the BRICS contemplate a move away from the US. So, another crisis assists Pakistan—in spite of Indian concerns on terrorism, on which there are four distinct, divergent apperceptions in the West:

1. Pakistan is surely complicit in sponsoring and backing terror/insurgent groups in Afghanistan and India, but some could argue the same with respect to the US’ patronage of jihadi groups in the war against the USSR, Chechen rebels in Russia, Islamist rebels in Syria, Sunni militias against the Shia militias, and AQI in Iraq.

2. Pakistan itself is threatened by a mix of Islamist terror groups as well as rabid sectarian outfits. While Pakistani armed forces can fight selected terror groups, such fighting imposes huge costs—and the abject state of Pakistan’s economy raises the spectre of Pakistan succumbing to militant groups, and even of a complete meltdown. The US view is that as long as terrorists of some stripes are being eliminated, the American and Pakistani objectives intersect.

3. Pakistan’s deceitful duplicity on certain terrorist entities (the Haqqanis, Taliban) during the US’ "war on terror" in Afghanistan was oft balanced by assisting the US in capturing or killing some key terrorists (the July 2022 killing of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahri in Kabul; and the US CENTCOM chief’s recent labelling of Pakistan as a "phenomenal partner" in counter-terrorism after handing over of two terrorists provide a context).

4. Terrorism within India matters little to the US.

Overall, the emerging US-Pakistan partnership, accompanied by partial sidelining of India, is a concerning development. And we seem to have been caught off-guard.

But that happens when one forgets that the singular objective of foreign relations and diplomacy is to safeguard the country’s national interests, and should be conducted quietly, maturely, behind closed doors, as opposed to ‘muscular diplomacy’ and abrasive public enunciations aimed primarily at addressing domestic electoral narratives. In contrast, Pakistan has for decades been able to balance on that tightrope of relationships with both China and the US.

Yet, Trump’s transactionalism is both a cautionary tale and an opening for India, and it remains to be seen how New Delhi now manages to align parts of US policy with Indian interests.

(Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)