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In international diplomacy, as in household budgeting, sometimes you pick the cheaper grain. Since early 2022, India’s energy choices have mirrored this analogy.
India’s oil imports from Russia have surged from two percent in early 2022 to nearly 40 percent by mid-2025, reflecting a strategic realignment. This shift, driven by sanctions-fueled discounts, yielded savings of approximately $7.9 billion in FY24 alone. But with import dependency rising (87.7 percent in FY25), Western scrutiny intensifying, and price advantages shrinking, India now faces mounting economic, geopolitical, and political risks.
The government continues to frame its approach as energy pragmatism rooted in strategic autonomy, though questions persist about its long-term viability and compatibility with global decarbonisation goals.
Before the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia accounted for under two percent of India’s oil imports.
By May 2023, Russia became India’s largest oil supplier at 1.96 million barrels per day (bpd), making up over 42 percent of India’s total oil imports. In FY24, Russian crude formed 33 percent of India’s oil basket, rising to 39 percent in the first eight months of FY25, ahead of Iraq (19 percent) and Saudi Arabia (13 percent).
According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), India spent Rs 1.5 lakh crore (€112.5 billion) on Russian oil between 2022 and 2025. Despite shrinking discounts, averaging $76.4/bbl for Russian crude in FY24 vs $85.3 for others, Indian refiners still saved an estimated $7.9 billion last fiscal year.
But the geopolitical context is hardening. In mid-2025, the Trump administration signalled the imposition of “secondary tariffs” on countries persisting in Russian oil trade. US Ambassador to NATO, Matt Whitaker, publicly named India and China as potential targets, while NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte issued a blunt warning to Brazil, China, and India, citing 100 percent tariffs. By mid-July, the US escalated its stance, threatening 500 percent penal tariffs.
This soon translated into action, as the administration announced a 25 percent tariff on Indian goods effective 1 August. The move could significantly sour India’s broader engagement with the US.
Petroleum Minister Hardeep Puri claimed India’s decisions helped avert global oil prices breaching $120–130 per barrel, positioning India as a stabilising force.
Importing discounted Russian crude has undoubtedly strengthened India’s macroeconomic position. Between FY23 and FY24, Urals crude discounts ranged from $8–23 per barrel, enabling Indian refiners to lower the landed cost of oil and generate substantial savings, estimated at $5.1 billion in FY23 and $7.9 billion in FY24. By early FY25, however, the discount had narrowed to just $3–4 per barrel. Though some margin remains ($1.5–2.5/bbl), the steepest arbitrage gains have already faded.
Upcoming EU sanctions on refined fuel exports derived from Russian feedstock could shrink India’s fuel export profits by $19–30 billion, down from a current annual value of $63 billion, tightening the fiscal cushion used to absorb energy shocks and fund domestic spending.
Adding to this pressure, the EU’s proposed secondary sanctions are poised to reshape the global floor price for Russian oil. Analysts estimate Urals crude could drop to around $47 per barrel, placing it permanently 15–20 percent below market benchmarks. For Russia, that means lower revenue.
Despite intensifying global headwinds, India continues to source Russian crude due to a combination of structural and strategic factors. First, re-exporting refined products, especially diesel and jet fuel has generated substantial value. Second, escalating instability in the Middle East, particularly near the Strait of Hormuz, has underscored the urgency of diversifying energy supply lines. Third, production cuts by OPEC+ members like Saudi Arabia and Iraq have made alternative sourcing routes not just desirable, but necessary.
A significant portion of India’s government revenue is tied to taxes on petroleum products. A lower global price cap, such as the proposed $47 per barrel for Urals crude, compresses the taxable base, tightening revenue streams at a time when fiscal pressures are already mounting. In that context, the evolving price cap isn't just a foreign policy challenge, it's a domestic economic concern of national interest.
However, should Russian oil become inaccessible due to sanctions, tariffs, or stricter compliance, Indian refiners may reallocate toward the U.S. West Texas Intermediate (WTI), Brazilian pre-salt barrels, and Middle Eastern term supplies. But these replacements could raise India’s import bill by $3–6 per barrel.
Amid US sanctions on Venezuela and uncertainty over Russian flows, India is likely to deepen ties with the US, Brazil, West Africa, and West Asia but with fewer discounts, less fiscal headroom, and far more diplomatic calculation.
Time to stabilise the economy, contain inflation, and assert strategic autonomy. But time, like cheap oil, doesn’t stay cheap forever.
As discounts erode and scrutiny sharpens, the trade-offs are becoming harder to ignore. The next chapter in India’s energy story will demand more foresight than firefighting, a necessary evolution in an increasingly polarised global order.
(The author is Legislative Assistants to Members of Parliament (LAMP) Fellow 2025 - PRS Legislative. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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