US Bombing Isn't a Real Blow to Iran's Nuclear Sites or Ambitions

It’s far from certain if the strikes have deprived Iran of the ability to make a nuclear bomb, writes Kuldip Singh.

The ‘Operation Midnight Hammer’ involved over 125 combat jets, with some B-2 bombers being deployed as decoys over the Pacific.

(Photo: Vibhushita Singh/The Quint)

It's official. The US has entered the Israel-Iran conflict.

On the intervening night of 21-22 June, the US deployed seven B-2 ‘Spirit’ bombers to drop ‘bunker-buster’ bombs on Iran’s Fordow and Natanz uranium enrichment facilities. Isfahan, reportedly the site holding Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, too, was hit with 24 submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The strike codenamed ‘Operation Midnight Hammer’ involved over 125 combat jets, with some B-2 bombers being deployed as decoys over the Pacific to hit Iran.

Iran's Nuclear Abilities Remain

Unlike Israel, Iran doesn’t possess nuclear weapons but is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the US, the UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany, under which it agreed to cap uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent for 15 years, reduce its enriched uranium stockpile, as well as accepted inspections of its nuclear sites by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

However, in May 2018, US President Donald Trump labelled the JCPOA as "terrible, one-sided, worst ever" and exited it. Iran yet remained engaged in talks with both the US and the European Union (EU) on its nuclear program. As per the May report of the IAEA, Iran had at least 408 kg of 60 percent enriched U-235, but Iran has repeatedly denied that it’s seeking nuclear weapons. In June, the head of the IAEA stated there is no proof of a "systematic effort [by Iran] to move into a nuclear weapon".

In March, US Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, testified that Iran is not currently building a nuclear weapon, but President Trump surprisingly rubbished that testimony as "wrong" on 21 June.

Enrichment and Nuclear Bombs

Both nuclear reactors as well as nuclear bombs require U-235 to sustain a fission chain reaction.

Since naturally occurring uranium contains only about 0.7 percent U-235 (rest is U-238), uranium ore is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas and then fed into fast-spinning centrifuges to separate the lighter U-235 isotopes from U-238. To achieve desired levels of enrichment, multiple centrifuges are connected in ‘cascades’, with the output of one centrifuge feeding into the next for incremental enrichment. Most reactors use ‘low-enriched uranium’ enriched up to 3.5 percent to 5 percent as fuel.

Uranium enriched beyond 20 percent concentration of U-235 is labelled ‘highly enriched uranium’ (HEU).

While, theoretically, a nuclear weapon can be made with 20 percent U-235 enriched material, and a crude nuclear weapon can be fabricated with even 60 percent enriched uranium, weapons-grade HEU typically enriched to 90 percent is required to make workable, smaller, lighter, deliverable nuclear weapons.

However, a nuclear weapon is much more than just enriched uranium. Substantial technological efforts are required to convert that enriched U-235 into a test nuclear device which can be as large as a small room.

Yet, more significant technical hurdles need to be overcome to convert that device into a deliverable nuclear weapon, i.e., a ruggedised, reliable, and miniaturised nuclear warhead that can withstand the rigours of launch atop a missile, high-speed travel, vibrations, and the heat of re-entry into the atmosphere, and yet function flawlessly.

Assessed Outcome of the Attack

The 13,000 kg GBU-57 bomb, which can be carried only in the B-2 bomber, impacts the target at speeds in excess of Mach 1 and uses kinetic energy to punch through about 60 metres of reinforced concrete before exploding inside the underground cavern. But, Iran, blessed with mountainous terrain, had keenly analysed Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor and the US’ air campaigns of 1991 and 2003, and buried its most critical nuclear facilities such as Fordow as deep as 100 metres.

President Trump has called the strikes a "spectacular military success" as "Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated", and demanded Iran pursue a peace deal with Israel.

The Pentagon separately stated that the extent of damage to the sites was unclear. Meanwhile, the IAEA has made an incredible post-strike claim—"no increase in off-site radiation levels"—which raises a critical question: if the said sites are destroyed, then why there are no enhanced levels of radiation? The answer may lie in two dynamics:

• Iran claims it moved out the enriched uranium from Isfahan (some satellite imagery also shows the overground entrances of the facilities being plugged with earth, suggesting the attack was expected)

• That the sites are not “totally obliterated”

In sum: It’s far from certain these strikes have deprived Iran of the ability to make a bomb.

In fact, given the unstated US’ policy of “bomb them if they don’t have a nuclear weapon(s), but negotiate if they have nuclear weapons”, these strikes will only strengthen Iranian resolve to acquire nuclear weapons through a more clandestine program which may be partly assisted by North Korea or China or Russia.

On 22 June, Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev said that several countries are ready to give Iran their nuclear warheads, even as President Vladimir Putin declared that despite the US intervention, “critical infrastructure of the nuclear fuel cycle” remained significantly intact, and “enrichment of nuclear material and... future production of nuclear weapons will continue.”

In turn, all this will lead the GCC states to also look at acquiring nuclear weapons, thereby destabilising the entire region.

Two Choices with America

The US-Israel combine now only has two options to fully ‘terminate’ Iran’s nuclear program.

One: Through a ground attack and physical occupation using troops alongside an air campaign.

Given Iran’s military capabilities, proxies, and mountainous geography, a ground invasion will be a nightmare for the US-Israel. At a geostrategic level, Russia and China would love that intervention—as it will tie down much of US military power just between the Caucasus and Persia Gulf, like it happened after 9/11. 

Two: Through a continued air campaign.

This holds the potential for region-wide dispersal of radioactivity from Isfahan (assuming the enriched stockpile hasn’t been moved out), as well as chemical contamination particularly into water (from uranium hexafluoride at enrichment sites). Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar all rely on desalinated water for all/much of their fresh water needs.

Iran's Options

It is assessed that Iranian strikes have already inflicted about $500 billion worth of damage on Israel. If that 408 kg of 60 percent enriched U-235 has survived, Iran can potentially fabricate around 8-10 nuclear weapons.

Alternatively, Iran could install parts of that stockpile atop its ballistic missiles to make a radioactive dispersal device (“dirty bomb”) and spew that 60 percent enriched U-235 over Israeli cities.

Any “dirty bomb” is simply radioactive material wrapped around an explosive device, which when exploded, disperses the radiological material widely.

They inflict very few human casualties immediately (some may die subsequently on account of exposure to radiation, cancers, etc), and their actual cost is economic. In 1987, in Goiania, Brazil, an accidentally broken tiny radiotherapy capsule of cesium chloride salt resulted in four deaths due to sustained exposure - and $20 million in damages and clean-up costs.

The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster has imposed costs of around $700 billion on cleanup, compensation, building of a containment structure, etc.

(Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)