Echoes of 3 May 2023: The Day That Tore Open the Land in Manipur, Divided People

Two years on, layers of many unresolved and unanswered questions remain in Manipur, writes Ngamjahao Kipgen.

Two years after the violence first broke out in Manipur, layers of many unresolved and unanswered questions remain.

(Photo: Vibhushita Singh/The Quint)

A few days ago, while browsing through news about Imphal, I stumbled upon an editorial piece in The Sangai Express titled, “Vengs, Rams in the valley, no Leikais in the hills of AA and Kuki State". Published way back on 8 August 2013, the editorial has become a prophecy of the events that unfolded a decade later, on 3 May 2023.

As the Kuki-Zo plan to observe “Separation Day” to solemnly commemorate two years of the start of the end, layers of many unresolved and unanswered questions remain.

For the benefit of readers who do not belong to the region, ‘Vengs’ denote localities in Kuki-Zo dialect, ‘Rams’ denote localities in Tangkhul (Naga) dialect, and ‘Leikais’ denote localities in Meitei/Manipuri.

The three types of settlements were interspersed and made up the social fabric of Manipur.

Interestingly, the editorial piece depicted the proposed maps of 'AA' (Alternative Arrangement), a demand raised by the United Naga Council (UNC), and 'Kuki State', a demand raised by the Kuki State Demand Committee (KSDC). Even in 2013, there were clear indications and messages for separation on all sides.

There has been violence, conflict, and intermittent fractures between the groups coexisting in Manipur in the past. But the present situation is unprecedented. Never before has the divide between two communities been so severe, so gut-wrenching, so seemingly permanent. Never before have the calls for complete separation (geographically and emotionally) of the Meitei (valley) and the Kuki-Zo (hill) people been louder. The separation had been prophesied. No one could, nonetheless, have imagined a day like this.

The clashes that took place since 3 May 2023 were not just incidents of violence. They were deep gashes intersecting geographic borders, changing maps, hearts and minds. Those gashes remain gaping. They are not just skin-deep. They have torn open the land, divided the people. The “idea of Manipur” is today in oblivion. It has become redundant.

Who are the Kukis and the Meiteis?

Various ethnic groups belonging to the Tibeto-Burman and the Indo-Aryan groups historically migrated and settled in Manipur. According to Gangmumei Kabui, author of History of Manipur, Volume One: Pre-Colonial Period, the present ethnic groups of Manipur, namely the Meiteis, the Naga tribes, the Kuki-Chin tribes, and other Indian communities are the descendants of those migrants. In 1904, GA Grierson grouped the Meitei in the Kuki-Chin sub-family of the Tibeto-Burman languages, as documented in the Linguistic Survey of India, Volume III, Part III.

Greatly influenced by the linguistic and cultural affinities between the Meitei and the hill tribes of Manipur and their folklore, W McCulloch advanced the theory that the major tribes and clans of the Meiteis appeared to have been the descendants of the Naga and Kuki tribes (McCulloch, W Account of the Valley of Munnipore and of the Hill Tribes, 1859).

While it may not be feasible to engage in discussions of who came from whom, the point is that the groups, no matter their origin, have lived together for eons in this region.

History of Othering

The ongoing conflict is not so much about the outcome of the 3 May All Tribal Students' Union Manipur rally against the Meitei outfits' demand for Scheduled Tribes (ST) recognition as it is about the implosion of decades (in fact, centuries) of identity politics, not just between Kukis and Meiteis but between the hill and the valley and the state and the non-state.

The fact that the fruits of development in contemporary Manipur have mainly remained confined to Imphal valley, where the dominant Meitei community resides, has left tribals increasingly alienated and marginalised.

Tribal leaders often allege that the Meitei groups' obsession with dominating over hill tribes has stalled any attempt at tribal autonomy. The state government is often accused of being biased in favour of Meitei outfits in the allocation of facilities and funds for development.

From even before the conflict, tribal leaders have continually complained about the lack of infrastructural development, the poor condition of the educational and health services, endemic poverty and lack of employment opportunities, and access to resources for the development of hill areas.

Even in 2023, though the ST demand and the protests against it provided the sudden spark, a majoritarian project had long been dormant and an ultra-nationalist 'Manipuri' feeling was in the making.

A few months before the mayhem, under the guise of a government survey, the Kuki-Zo quarters and houses in and around the mixed-populated Game village of Imphal were marked out. As has become a familiar pattern in the past two years, mobs of unidentified men led by Arambai Tenggol and Meitei Leepun had no difficulty in identifying the houses belonging to the Kuki-Zo families when the time came.

The fact that the thousands of city police of Imphal remained mute spectators to what was unfolding in their presence and before their eyes smacked of unmistakable premeditation and preplanning by those in power. In fact, some Meitei supremacist leaders even admitted this in the national media. For instance, Meitei Leepun chief Pramot Singh, at the forefront of the ethnic violence, in an interview with The Wire, admitted that he had his militia already in position along the fringe of the valley since early 2023.

The rapid destruction of Kuki villages along the foothill areas would not have been possible unless it was planned in advance—and unless the Meitei militants had been well prepared for the strike.

It's All About the Land

The present conflict is solely orchestrated on the basis of contestation over land—as posited by the Meitei MLA Nishikant Sapam in viral interviews.

About 90 percent of Manipur is made up of hills, which are protected under the Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (MLR & LR) Act,1960, prohibiting non-tribals (like the Meiteis) from purchasing those lands. The Meiteis, whose numbers are disproportionate to the area of land they own, seem to have a grudge for not being allowed legally to settle in hill areas like the tribals living in Imphal.

Their demand for inclusion in the ST list, seemingly a means to circumvent this law, is potentially dangerous, as it would disrupt the socio-economic and political equation of the state. It would enable them to corner all benefits of reservations for STs in Manipur.

Sections of the Meitei have also been resentful of reservations for tribal communities in jobs within the central public sector, claiming that opportunities for educated Meitei youth are limited and demanding implementation of the MLR & LR Act 1960 (it was amended in 1989) in the hill areas.

Land has become scarce in the valley areas while the lack of land reforms in the hill areas has ensured that tribal lands are inalienable. Hence, it is not surprising to find land becoming the central focus of ethnic competition over resources and the justification of indigeneity in Manipur as in other parts of Northeast India.

Therefore, the presence of Vengs/Rams in Imphal valley has been an eyesore to Meitei outfits for quite some time. It was a magma ready to explode at any moment, waiting for a spark. And 3 May 2023 seemed to be the opportune time to unleash their long-planned hatred on the Kuki-Zo people.

Kuki Demand for Homeland is Not Two Years Old

There have been attempts to vilify the Kuki-Zo in recent months, with some claiming that the groups have used the violence to gain mileage for their political demands.

This is far from true. The Kukis' aspiration for a separate homeland or state dates back to the 1960s, when the Kuki National Assembly sent a representation to the pre-independence period. In 1963, to foster political unity and forge an ethnic identity, many Kuki chiefs came together under a Kuki Chiefs’ Association that later led to the formation of the Kuki National Assembly (KNA) on 24 October 1946 in order to make concerted efforts to preserve their territorial integrity and political future.

The KNA planned to establish another pan-Kuki platform for the Kuki-Chin kindred groups of Manipur and were hopeful that they would regain political independence after the British left India in 1947. In its working committee meeting held on 11 August 1947, the chiefs announced their three-point objective to unite Kuki groups, achieve better understanding with the Nagas, and peacefully cooperate with the Meitei residing in the valleys of Manipur.

The Nagas declared their political independence in August 1947 and asserted that they would follow an armed path to achieve a separate nation if necessary. Meanwhile, the Kuki chiefs collectively tried to dissuade the Meitei Maharaja from signing the political agreement of the merger of Manipur into India but were finally unsuccessful (Thomson 1971).

The Kuki chiefs were quite disheartened when Manipur joined the Indian Union in September 1949 and proclaimed that the Kukis had never been part of India until the British annexed them in the Anglo-Kuki War (1917-1919), hence no reason to be part of India after the British left.

The KNA drafted a seventeen-point election manifesto to fight the elections in 1952, wherein they declared their opposition to the merger of Manipur into Assam and stressed their distinctive political status and identity. The KNA held a general meeting at Thingkangphai village in Churachandpur from 19-22 January 1960, prepared a memorandum, and resolved to submit it to the Government of India to assert their political freedom and autonomy, and demand a separate Kuki state, as noted in Kuki State – A Memorandum of the KNA to the Prime Minister of India, 1960.

This unfulfilled demand was subsequently revived again in the 1980s by the Kuki armed insurgents (the pioneer among them was the Kuki National Front under the leadership of Nehlun Kipgen). The political mobilisation of the members of the Kuki community in support of a ‘Kuki homeland’ has revived their ethnic-nationalism under the aegis of the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and the United People’s Front (UPF).

The KNO and the UPF have signed a Suspension of Operations (SoO) with the Government of India and the state government of Manipur in August 2008. Seemingly, there is a paradigm shift in terms of the KNO and the UPF demands post 3 May 2023. Earlier, their political demand was in the form of a Territorial Council in the line of Bodoland Territorial Council, but now their demand is for a separate administration, i.e., a Union Territory of Puducherry model within the framework of the Constitution.

The violent outbreak of the May 2023 conflict with the Meitei has deepened their conviction that a separate administration is the only way forward.

What Now?

The current imbroglio is the handiwork of former Manipur Chief Minister N Biren Singh—and his cohorts must be credited for this separation/division of hill and valley.

In fact, this mayhem is unprecedented and the first of its kind in the history of post-independence India. As a consequence, buffer zones (distinct territorial boundaries) have been created, and village volunteers on both sides have been manning them for the past two odd years or so now. It’s akin to the biblical inscription on the wall “mene mene tekel upharsin” (the message signifies that King Belshazzar's kingdom will be divided).

Although the Meitei communities gradually continue to pour into the hills and its adjoining areas and thereby began to settle mostly in Kuki-inhabited or dominated areas (bypassing the hill land laws), slogans such as Hingminnasi eikhoi (let’s live together) and Chingmi-Tam’mi amatani (hill dwellers and valleys/plains men are the same) are now words of the past. These sentiments seem to have outlived their utility and have become dinosaurs now.

Perhaps the plight of the Kuki-Zos would be akin to the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits—in terms of forceful eviction and displacement from the Imphal valley and adjoining foothill areas. However, the intensity and magnitude of the loss and sufferings of the Kuki-Zo are colossal and insurmountable.

Mention may be made that there are (were?) a number of Kuki-Zo vengs/localities in Imphal valley alone, viz. Haokip Veng, Khongsai Veng, Paite Veng, Hmar Veng, Vaiphei Veng, Lambulane (Old and New), Chahsad Avenue, Zomi Villa, to new a few. The majority of the residents in these valley, Vengs were government (both state and central) employees, living there for generations. Each household literally invested almost their lifetime savings in building houses and properties.

Two years since the violence, thousands of Kuki-Zos remain displaced not only from the valley districts but also from the foothill areas. Hundreds of churches have been razed down to ashes.

Ironically, the Meitei community in the past few weeks has been demanding access to the pilgrimage sites at Thangting/Thangjing and Simtongbung/Koubru Hill (that pass throug Kuki areas) that they percieve sacred. The community forgets that these sites are equally sacred and revered by the Kuki-Zo, as they share a symbiotic relationship with the surrounding hills based on their socio-cultural beliefs—their notion of identity and belongingness is embedded in the territory and landscapes they have inhabited for generations.

It is also another matter that in course of the conflict, hundreds of shrines were razed to the ground in the Imphal valley and adjoining foothills that were revered by the Kuki-Zo.

Apparently, there has been a situation of lull and calm in the past few months. A picture of "peace" has been conjured.

A political commentator observed that the major chunk of the Meitei outfits goal has now been largely achieved—as their primary agenda was to wipe out (read “ethnically cleanse”) the Kuki-Zo from the valley and adjoining foothills. Many Kuki villages have either been ransacked or reduced to rubble, and their properties forcefully occupied by the Meitei militant groups, in clear violation of the Supreme Court order in President-ruled Manipur.

But in the buffer zones and the Kuki-dominated areas close to the foothills, small battles rage on, underscoring the larger battles over autonomy and identity. Thousands are still displaced and languishing in relief camps—many facing a humanitarian crisis.

There is no guarantee of safety against future acts of ethnic violence on either side. The President’s Rule and consequent “free movement” directives have failed to restore 'normalcy' as locals have perceived them as forceful impositions on the Kuki-Zo areas. In reality, the problems are much deeper than such cosmetic measures can fix.

The question remains: Will the Indian government be able to resolve the ethnic conflict and restore a long lasting peace in Manipur? At the moment, absolute peace and normalcy seem elusive.

(Ngamjahao Kipgen is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati. This is an opinion piece. All views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)