Why Modi Let Pakistan Take the Stage at Trump’s Gaza Summit

India’s foreign ministry is like a batsman facing a mystery spinner, with Trump as both umpire and captain.

Yet another terrific googly by US President Donald Trump was his decision to invite both PM Modi and Pakistan's Shehbaz Sharif to participate in the Sharm-el-Sheikh meet last week.

(Photo: Vibhushita Singh/The Quint)

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and American President Donald Trump may not have met in a while, and their recent conversations may have been sparse, but the POTUS and his actions continue to haunt India. They are not quite a malign presence, but they have the potential of being embarrassing.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs is like a batsman facing a mystery spinner, having to judge each ball thrown by Trump, the umpire-cum-bowler. So whether they are no-balls or wides doesn’t matter, India has to play each shot or else pay a price. As it is, that umpire has placed tariffs on India—25 percent basic ones, plus an additional 25 percent as penalty for oil trade with Russia.

And yet another terrific googly by the American umpire was his decision to invite both PM Modi and Pakistan's Shehbaz Sharif to participate in the Sharm-el-Sheikh meet last week.

Trump Courts Pakistan at Gaza Peace Meet

Formally, it was a signing ceremony of the “Trump Peace Agreement” among the four countries that had worked out the Gaza 'accord'—Turkey, Qatar, the US, and Egypt (nominally the host). Israel was excluded at the request of Turkey, and India decided to send its Minister of State (MoS) instead of the PM. Barring the four principals, others, including the Presidents of France and Indonesia, the PMs of the United Kingdom and Italy, or the King of Jordan, were merely the audience.

Pakistani PM Shehbaz Sharif, however, was thrust into the limelight by Trump when he invited him as the only other speaker besides himself and the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.

Clearly overwhelmed, Sharif rose to the occasion, saluted Trump for his “exemplary” and “visionary leadership” and said he would nominate him for the Nobel Peace Prize, not only because of the Gaza accord, but because “he brought peace in South Asia, saved millions of people, their lives.” He was clearly playing to the trope of Trump’s role in mediating the end of the India-Pakistan war in May.

We don’t know just why Trump pushed Sharif forward, maybe he wanted to hear himself being praised, or perhaps he envisages a role for Pakistan in enforcing peace in Gaza during Phase II of his plan.

What Could Have Been in Store for Modi?

We can only speculate as to just what role Trump had planned for Modi, or whether he had envisaged one at all. But the PM risked being sucked into an unpleasant situation of providing a prop for Trump’s photo-op as the South Asian peace-maker. Opposition leaders like Shashi Tharoor have criticised the government for maintaining a “strategic distance” and reducing India’s influence at the summit in terms of protocol and access.

As Prime Minister, Modi would have been able to interact with a cross-section of international leaders and maintained India’s claim as a significant player in West Asia which is friendly with Israel, as well as with a clutch of Arab states from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It recognises Palestine as an independent country and is also friendly with Iran.

Overall, Modi’s decision to skip was wise, particularly from a risk management and diplomatic posturing perspective. India probably preferred to avoid potential controversies (both domestic and international).

The decision allows New Delhi to support the peace process—which still has a long, long way to go—even while retaining the flexibility to manage its relationships and messaging. But it doesn’t come without costs: in high-stakes diplomacy, being physically present among other heads of state tends to give you stronger influence. India may have missed out on some informal conversations and side deals.

What's "wise” also depends on what India valued more in this moment: risk avoidance and diplomatic control vs maximising influence and public visibility.

If Modi judged that the risks (of awkward optics, Pakistan, claims by others, domestic backlash) outweighed the benefits, then it is defensible. But if India wanted to assert greater leadership or secure a central role in post-conflict reconstruction discussions, skipping was not a good idea.

The Russian Affair

Another tricky yorker has been Trump's claim that India has agreed to stop oil purchases from Russia. On Wednesday, Trump told reporters at the White House that Modi has assured him India will stop buying oil from Russia, a move he described as a “big step” in efforts to isolate Moscow.

“So I was not happy that India was buying oil, and he assured me today that they will not be buying oil from Russia…” He added that this could not be done immediately. “It’s a little bit of a process, but the process is going to be over with soon.”

At the same time he said Modi was a “great man. He loves Trump,” referring to himself in third person. Going off on a tangent, he added that he didn’t want that “love” to be misunderstood, “I don’t want to destroy his political career.”

Just when Modi is alleged to have said this to Trump this is not clear. There is no official confirmation of any direct communication between the two this week.

On the other hand, the Ministry of External Affairs has put out a response on Thursday which is a non sequitur. It declares that the aim of the Indian energy policy “is to safeguard the interests of the Indian consumer in a volatile energy scenario.” Couched in diplomatese, the statement does not address Trump’s claim but asserts that the twin goals of Indian energy policy have been stability of energy prices and secure supplies. To this end, India has sought to expand its energy procurement from the US.

Business Disruptions

Last week, there was news that there had been a 10 percent dip in imports since January, but even so, India still accounts for a significant proportion of Russian exports as of now. Incidentally, figures show that while state-owned refiners have cut imports from Russia by 45 percent since the beginning of the year, crude imports by private operators have peaked in September.

Adding to the pressure on India is the European Union's decision to ban all imports of petroleum products refined in a third country from Russian-origin crude oil, starting 21 January 2026. This will directly affect India since a significant proportion, some estimates put it at 16 percent, of the Russian oil refined in India goes to Europe as diesel and jet fuel.

It should be noted that Russia is not a traditional supplier of oil to India. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, India ramped up its oil imports from a negligible 0.2 percent to 40 percent, saving some $17 billion because of the discounts. In other words, India went in for the imports for economic reasons.

But now there is a growing chorus of nations demanding an end to the imports for geopolitical reasons. The US and Europe believe that if India stops buying Russian oil, it will push Moscow towards a peace agreement on Ukraine. A curtailment at this juncture will not only be an economic loss for India, but also a geopolitical setback in our relationship with Russia.

The big question is whether New Delhi would be able to countenance this. Will it not reflect on its vaunted claim of strategic autonomy? On the other hand, it would seem that the pressure on New Delhi on account of the Russian purchases has reached a tipping point.

(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)