'Governors Can’t Stall Democracy': SC's Ruling is Bigger Than Just RN Ravi

The verdict reaffirms that the governor’s office is not a weapon to subvert an elected government’s mandate.

The Supreme Court called Tamil Nadu Governor RN Ravi’s conduct "illegal and erroneous" and issued clear timelines for gubernatorial decisions on state legislation.

(Photo: Vibhushita Singh/The Quint)

In a sharp and resounding judgment on 8 April, 2025, the Supreme Court of India delivered what may well be one of the most consequential rulings in recent constitutional history.

The court called Tamil Nadu Governor RN Ravi’s conduct "illegal and erroneous" and issued clear timelines for gubernatorial decisions on state legislation.

The verdict reaffirms an enduring constitutional truth: that the governor’s office is not above democratic accountability and certainly not a weapon to subvert an elected government’s mandate.

While the judgment was rooted in Tamil Nadu’s case specifics, its implications reverberate far beyond. It sends an unmistakable message to all constitutional authorities: India’s federalism is not ornamental but operational. And when that structure is disrupted, the courts will not stand by.

It is not every day that the Supreme Court reaches into the archives of the Constituent Assembly to cite Dr BR Ambedkar. But the bench did exactly that, invoking his searing words: "However good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it happen to be a bad lot."

It was perhaps one of the most damning ways to describe a constitutional functionary—a rebuke not only of Governor RN Ravi’s actions but of the political culture that enabled them. This wasn’t just a legal verdict. It was a moral correction—a resetting of constitutional bearings.

A Verdict That Rewrites the Norms

The judgment is now being spoken of in the same breath as the SR Bommai case, a 1994 landmark that clipped the Centre’s wings under Article 356 and strengthened the hands of state governments. Much like that turning point, this judgment rewrites conventions that had, until now, allowed governors to operate with impunity.

At its core was Ravi’s inexplicable delay, spanning several years, in acting on ten bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Assembly. By declaring that these bills were deemed to have received assent due to the governor’s unconstitutional silence, the Supreme Court has created a new constitutional doctrine: that inaction, too, has consequences.

Significance of the Ten Bills 

These bills primarily amend the acts of various state universities to vest the power of appointing Vice Chancellors (VCs) with the state government, curtailing the discretionary powers of the governor who, as Chancellor, traditionally oversaw the process.

The apex court’s intervention not only clears the legislative bottleneck but also reaffirms the constitutional principle that governors must act on the aid and advice of the elected government, especially in matters where legislative competence clearly lies with the state.

On the ground, this clears the way for the Tamil Nadu government to assert greater control over public higher education institutions by influencing the selection of academic leadership. This comes at a time when the University Grants Commission (UGC) had issued its own guidelines for VC appointments, mandating a search committee with a UGC nominee and specific qualifications. 

Notably, the court laid down timeframes—ranging from one to three months—for a governor to act. This has effectively ended the ‘pocket veto’ culture, where governors stonewall legislation by simply doing nothing.

As Justice JB Pardiwala noted with clarity, “A governor is a catalyst, not an inhibitor.” But Ravi has, at every turn, chosen to be the latter. Rather than easing governance, he has blocked it. Rather than being an impartial figure, he has inserted himself as a partisan actor.

Ravi’s Tenure: A Pattern of Provocation

Since he assumed office in 2021, Ravi’s tenure has been marred by conflict and controversy. His repeated walkouts from the Assembly, including the one in January 2025; his refusal to read portions of the Governor’s Address that referred to Tamil Nadu’s “Dravidian Model”; his unilateral attempt to dismiss Minister Senthil Balaji; and his hesitancy to reinduct K Ponmudi into the cabinet—all show a disturbing pattern.

In case after case, it has taken the Supreme Court or public backlash to rein him in.

In the Perarivalan case, the court had to reiterate that the governor must act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. That Governor Ravi chose to ignore this until compelled by the court shows either gross ignorance or deliberate defiance of the constitutional framework.

Even more revealing was the petrol bomb incident in 2023, where the Raj Bhavan alleged a serious conspiracy against the constitutional head of the state. The National Investigation Agency (NIA), however, found nothing more than a routine law-and-order issue—directly contradicting the hyperbole emanating from the governor’s office.

Is it plausible to believe all of this happened in isolation? Or does this reflect a broader central strategy—where certain governors act as extensions of Delhi’s political apparatus, especially in opposition-ruled states?

When Governors Turn Partisan

Governor RN Ravi’s conduct is not an isolated aberration but part of a broader and troubling trend across several opposition-ruled states. In West Bengal, Kerala, Karnataka, Telangana, and Punjab, governors have increasingly acted in ways that disrupt the constitutional balance—delaying assent to bills, bypassing elected ministers, summoning bureaucrats directly, and breaching established protocols.

This creeping pattern of gubernatorial overreach has raised serious concerns about the erosion of democratic norms and the misuse of constitutional offices for political purposes.

The Supreme Court’s verdict, therefore, is far more than a censure of one individual. It is a landmark affirmation of India’s federal architecture and a timely intervention to safeguard democratic institutions.

By making it clear that governors cannot indefinitely withhold assent to bills passed by state legislatures, the court has shut the door on a growing tactic of passive obstruction. This ruling reinforces the principle that governors are constitutional figureheads, not political agents, who must act on the advice of the elected Council of Ministers.

This verdict sets a vital precedent for other states grappling with similar impasses. It offers not only legal clarity but also empowers state governments to assert their democratic mandate with constitutional backing.

The judgment restores dignity to the Raj Bhavan by laying down time-bound procedures, limiting arbitrary discretion, and emphasising accountability.

It also places a much-needed check on the politicisation of the governor’s office, reaffirming that India’s Constitution is a living document meant to uphold the spirit of representative democracy, not undermine it.

In doing so, the court has strengthened the foundations of cooperative federalism and offered a robust defence against central encroachment.

Tamil Nadu’s Resistance Pays Off

It is fitting that this constitutional reset has come from Tamil Nadu.

For decades, Tamil Nadu, under various governments, has been at the forefront of resisting the Centre’s centralising impulses. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) government under MK Stalin has built upon this tradition, resisting Ravi’s high-handedness and fighting back on issues like NEET, language imposition, and fiscal federalism.

This verdict vindicates that resistance. Stalin called it “historic,” and rightly so. This judgment equips all states, irrespective of political affiliation, with legal armour to protect their autonomy.

In a federal democracy, the Centre must be the glue, not the gatekeeper. This judgment re-establishes that understanding.

A Line in the Sand

India is a Union of States—not a unitary state with states as glorified municipalities. Governors are not viceroys. Nor are they palace guards for Delhi. They are constitutional umpires, not political enforcers.

What this judgment accomplishes is far more than correcting one man’s overreach. It restores balance to a federal structure that has been dangerously tilting toward central domination.

In doing so, it places responsibility where it belongs: on the Union government, to respect the autonomy of states; on the governors, to adhere to their constitutional oath; and on the courts, to remain the final line of defence when all else fails.

With this ruling, the Supreme Court has fortified the guardrails of Indian federalism. It has curtailed arbitrary power and reinforced democratic accountability. Most importantly, it has reaffirmed the Constitution’s core promise: that governance in India shall be by the people, through their elected representatives, not at the whim of unelected appointees.

This is not merely a verdict. It is a line in the sand. One that cannot be crossed again.

(The author is an education consultant and political analyst based in Bengaluru. This is an opinion piece. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)