Saudi Has Enormous Leverage on Pakistan. Will it Use it to De-escalate Tensions?

Saudi Arabia has stakes in both India and Pakistan. Any escalation in the region threatens its stability directly.

On 8 May, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir visited New Delhi on an unannounced meeting. He met External Affairs Minister Jaishankar. The following day he visited Islamabad.

(Photo: X/Altered by The Quint)

On Thursday, 8 May, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir visited New Delhi on an unannounced meeting. He met External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar against the backdrop of Operation Sindoor, which India had launched a day ago as retaliation for the Pahalgam terror attack.

“A good meeting with @AdelAljubeir, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia this morning,” Jaishankar said on social media following the visit.

“Shared India’s perspectives on firmly countering terrorism," Jaishankar further wrote.

The following day the Saudi minister visited Islamabad as tensions between India and Pakistan escalated with Pakistan’s drone attacks on multiple Indian civilian facilities. Obviously, the visit was aimed to talk the sides into de-escalation.

It is not difficult to understand why Saudi Arabia would take such a proactive position. (The only other foreign representative to visit both New Delhi and Islamabad in a bid to diffuse tensions between the two neighbours was Iran's foreign minister Abbas Araghchi.)

Saudi Arabia has enormous stakes in both India and Pakistan—and any escalation in the region threatens its stability directly.

Expansion of India-Saudi Strategic Partnership Council

Both India and Pakistan have large expatriate communities in the Saudi Kingdom, remitting back hefty foreign exchange—an important source of income for both. For the Saudis, they represent an important component of the country 's workforce. The Saudis have also invested much in both countries.

It is important to note here that when the Pahalgam terror attacks happened, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was on an official visit to Saudi Arabia. While he cut short his visit and returned home, Modi’s visit, nevertheless, had been significant.

Four important agreements—in space, health and anti-doping—were signed during the bilateral. But what was more important, however, was the expansion of the India-Saudi Arabia Strategic Partnership Council (SPC) from two to four committees—one on defence and thd other or socio-cultural.

Considering this was the second meeting of the SPC, which Modi and the Crown Prince chaired, this was significant, reflecting the growing ties in a key area like defence.

Saudi Arabia is a major source of both India and Pakistan's energy needs. In 2023-24, India sourced 14 percent of its crude oil from Saudi Arabia, while Pakistan imported 30 percent of its requirements from the Kingdom.

India is Saudi Arabia's second largest trading partner. In 2023-24, Indian exports to Saudi Arabia stood at $11.56 billion while imports were at $31.42 billion, with the balance of payment neatly in favour of the Saudis.

Moreover, the Saudis are committed to investing $100 billion in India, and during Modi's recent visit committed to setting up an oil refinery in India.

Pakistan's Dependency on Saudis

With Pakistan, Saudi Arabia’s trade volumes are lower—in 2024, Pakistan's total exports totalled $738 million while imports were $4.47 billion.

What gives Saudi Arabia great leverage over Pakistan are the grants and loans that it has provided—and continues to provide—which greatly help to keep Pakistan’s bankrupt economy afloat.

For instance, some of Pakistan’s key institutions like the International Islamic University and the Faisal Mosque in Islamabad were built with millions of dollars in grants from the Saudis.

In recent years, the Kingdom has provided a deposit of $3 billion to the State Bank of Pakistan for a year, which has beenrolled over each year till now.

This financial support from Saudi Arabia helps bolster Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves and strengthens its economy. The rollover loans from Saudi Arabia, as well as from other countries like China, help Pakistan procure loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

This year again, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia agreed to a one-year deferment of a $1.2 billion payment related to Saudi oil imports. This agreement, signed on 3 February 2025, allows Pakistan to receive the oil while postponing the payment.

Saudi Arabia has also given a loan amounting to $80 million for the construction of Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Plant, and is the second biggest donor to Pakistan’s flood victims.

Total Saudi investment in Pakistan stands at approximately $2.8 billion, and the Kingdom has pledged $10 billion to build an oil refinery in Pakistan's Gwadar Port—something that would enable Saudi involvement in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

All of this gives the Saudis enormous leverage over Pakistan, which the former have used in a calibrated manner. For instance, when in 2019, the then Prime Minister Imran Khan, together with leaders of Turkiye, Malaysia, and Qatar, tried to float an alternative Muslim platform to the Organisation of Islamic Conference, it took one call from Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for Imran Khan to pull out of the initiative.

This time, too, Saudis can use some levers to get Pakistan to de-escalate and even further to eliminate terror groups it nurtures.

The Spread of Radical Islam

The Saudis are no stranger to Pakistan’s wheeling-dealing with jihadist groups. When Pakistan's Defense Minister recently confessed on television that Pakistan had been creating and nurturing terrorist groups on behalf of the US and the West, much of the funds for this came from the Saudis.

The Crown Prince himself had in an interview once acknowledged that Saudi Arabia had been instrumental in the spread of radical Islam across the world, in order to combat Iran's spread of Shhite theocracy.

Pakistan had implemented on the ground much of this endeavour, whether in South Asia, Central Asia, or in Western countries. Osama bin Laden, whom the Saudis expelled and excommunicated, when he directly threatened the Saudi royal family, was found hiding in Pakistan.

The Gulf monarchies are mortally scared of Islamism and jihadist groups who directly threaten their rule. That explains the investments in recent years to domestic reforms, the encouragement and promotion of religious tolerance, as well as labour reforms, and the banning of the Muslim Brotherhood and all affiliated groups by them.

The ascendancy of Taliban 2.0 in Kabul in 2021 had alarmed the Gulf countries. Their strategy is to coopt with money and funds as we see in the case of both Afghanistan and now Syria. Alongside this, there are other more covert measures taken by restricting visas, deporting people, and monitoring as we have seen happen with Pakistan.

Saudis are particularly vulnerable, given their large young population, unlike other Gulf states, and the Kingdom's status as the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.

This is why too, in recent times, the Saudis while strengthening economic, defence, and cultural partnership with India has deepened intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism cooperation with India. It is now, therefore, incumbent on India, to impress upon the Saudis the nature of the Pakistani state, and its continuous supping with the jihadist groups, even if one allows they are India-specific.

On Saturday morning, as the conflict between India and Pakistan has considerably escalated with Pakistan announcing the launch of Operation Bunyan Ul Marsoos, the Saudi Foreign Ministry in a brief statement said that upon the directives of the Saudi leadership, Adel Al-Jubeir visited India and Pakistan on 8 May and 9 May, respectively, as part of the Kingdom's "ongoing efforts to de-escalate tensions, end current military confrontations, and promote the resolution of all disputes through dialogue and diplomatic channels."

Of the few countries who can truly make a meaningful contribution for deescalation, it is Saudi Arabia with its tremendous leverage on Pakistan.

(The author is an award-winning journalist specialising on Eurasian affairs. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)