Can ‘Operation Black Forest’ Be the Beginning of the End of Maoist Violence?

In one of the fiercest anti-Naxal operations ever, the Indian security forces claim to have killed 31 Maoist rebels.

Image used for representational purposes only. 

(Photo: PTI)

When India was engaged in a war-like situation on its Western border with Pakistan, deep in the heart of peninsular India, a 21-day armed operation was underway to dismantle the unified headquarters of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) or CPI (Maoist) in the Karegutta hill in Chhattisgarh-Telangana border, guarded by Battalion No 1, the strongest Maoist military formation of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA).

A “decisive” week for Indian security forces claiming victory in 'Operation Sindoor' and 'Operation Black Forest'. Except, the latter which has far more significance for India and India’s internal security, has utterly failed to whip up the now-so-familiar nationalistic fervour and media frenzy—or draw international spotlight.

There are no narratives for the political elite to spin or no votes to count among the most disenfranchised citizens who inhabit those areas, even though we are talking about resource-rich areas of the nation.

Impact of the Operation

To understand the strategic importance of this operation, see how many of the CPI (Maoist) groups were operating from this place. Sukma-Bijapur-Telangana border was the stronghold of the South Bastar Divisional Committee that included Kistaram, Konta, Pamed and Jagargunda.

It also housed the Telangana State Committee, North Telangana Special Zonal Committee, Andhra Odisha Border Special Zonal Committee and PLGA Battalion No 1, of which Company Number 1 was headquartered in this area. Company Number 2 was headquartered in Gangalur area but recalled to Karegutta hill for the battle.

The HQ has continuously shifted westward towards Telangana after the Indian security force camps were set up along Sukma-Bijapur border in November 2024. First, they moved from Sukma-Bijapur border to Usur-Pamed side, then the camps along Pamed side pushed them further towards Usur—Galgam, Nambi, Pujarikanker, Gunjeparti, then the most recent set of camps near Pujarikanker and Bheemaram pushed them further onto the hills.

In one of the fiercest and well-planned anti-Naxal operations ever, the Indian security forces claim to have killed 31 Maoist rebels in a time-bound pitched battle. They, however, lost three Greyhound commandoes and several soldiers were injured.

A Heavy Blow, But No Knockout

They “neutralised” 168 cadres this year alone. According to government data, since 2024, Indian soldiers have killed at least 400 rebels. According to a news release, 718 Naxalites have so far surrendered in the first four months of 2025.

From the government point of view, this is indeed “decisive” if not conclusive. The Home Minister had announced his “sankalp” to eliminate Naxals by 31 March 2026. Overtures of peace talks were rejected. They want a fight to the finish.

The propaganda video by the government was quickly disseminated showcasing 28,000 troops from different units, including the District Reserve Guard, Bastar Fighters, Special Task Force, all units of the State Police, and the Central Reserve Police Force and its elite CoBRA unit, involved in 'Operation Black Forest', navigating a picturesque but treacherous terrain that for decades remained unmapped.

The security forces produced evidence of destroying bunkers, seizing weapons, weapon-making factories, raw materials for explosives, medical and food provisions for more than a year. But senior officers have expressed frustration of not getting adequate support from Telengana police, even alleging that they may have facilitated the Maoist escape.

There is no doubt that the organisation has been hit hard at what was considered an impregnable and unreachable safe zone. However, there is no credible data of the exact strength and structure of the group and how badly it has been dented. Those killed carried a bounty of Rs 1.72 crore, indicating that some top functionaries may have been killed. But the dreaded Battalion No 1 is still at large—and no one from Central Committee have been killed.

The real dent is that the committees have been scattered and regular communication between them suspended. Local sources tell me that many Telengana leaders have fled, leaving behind the Adivasis. The Battalion No 1 has divided themselves into subgroups headed in different directions. This means it will take time to estimate the strength of the remaining fighting cadres who will lie low and may regroup. This has been the pattern of the Maoist insurgency and a classical guerrilla tactic.

India’s Biggest Internal Security Threat

The 58-year story of the Maoist insurgency has been one of splits and mergers and regrouping across the eastern and central Indian districts.

The Maoist insurgency started in late sixties in Naxalbari near Siliguri in West Bengal—and through its fractured growth and spread, it merged into a formidable insurgent force spread across several states.

The Maoists believe in the 'annihilation of class enemies' and in extreme violence. Their propaganda literature says they want to usher ‘New Democratic Revolution’ by overthrowing the semi-colonial, semi-feudal system under the neo-colonial form of indirect rule, exploitation and control.

"This revolution will be carried out and completed through armed agrarian revolutionary war, i.e. protracted people’s war with the armed seizure of power remaining as its central and principal task, encircling the cities from the countryside and thereby finally capturing them."

Considered as the "biggest internal security challenge" for many decades, the Maoists or Naxals have been able to grab national headlines with their brutal violence. The statistics of their violence and influence are staggering. The words 'Adivasi' and 'tribal' have often been synonymous with Maoist expansion which is visibly high in tribal areas though they operated across 20 states of the country.

This violence is also embedded with semantic subversions like ‘land struggle’, ‘peasant uprising’, ‘armed agrarian uprising’ or even ‘revolutionary armed struggle’. This semantic relationship has polarised public and political opinions for and against what has popularly become an anti-establishment stance.

A Revolution with a Roadmap

The Maoists are much coherent on their agenda than, for example, the armed groups in India’s Northeast. So, there is little confusion about their agenda and tactic: the Maoists have a well-thought-of action plan and agenda which has being followed by the armed groups consistently.

Since 2004, when the CPI (Maoists) formulated their Strategy and Tactics, they spread from 160 districts in the country to 223 across 20 states. Today, the affected districts sit at only 18, with better coordinated government operations and resource-starved guerilla groups that have lost control and appeal among its constituency.

In many of the areas like the ‘Black Forest’, the geographical advantage was always with the Maoists.

They typically operated in what they see as a perceived administrative vacuum. But, on the ground, the Maoists were also seen as opportunists, though very organised. For example, they raised issues of development but at the same time vehemently opposed any development activity. Their organisational strength has been tested at various levels but they prevailed. A beleaguered police force had no confidence of taking them on. 'Operation Black Forest' has certainly changed that with the battle tipping in favour of the state.

But what stares on the face of these almost unadministered areas is an invisible control by the Maoists. Along the so-called Maoist corridor, Maoist signposts of bus stations and welcome plaques were common sights. In these liberated zones, they were dispensing or claiming to be dispensing basic state functions of administration, policing, and justice. It is obvious that the state agencies had absolved themselves of governance in some of India’s richest natural resource areas.

To deliver his promise to erase Naxal violence, the Home Minister must be well advised to look back at how these guerillas have sustained over half a century. How will he fight their ideological battle that for the common Adivasi translates to a dignified life of an Indian citizen?

Like any political leader, he imagines he campaign for ‘development’ will replace violence. Kashmir would have taught him otherwise. India today has adequate resources to deal with insurgent challenges but the state still suffers from an inability to look beyond the immediate and devise a political consensus for a long-term solution.

(Kishalay Bhattacharjee is Dean, Jindal School of Journalism and Communication and author most recently of Where the Madness Lies: Citizen Accounts of Identity and Nationalism (Orient Black Swan). This is an opinion piece. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)