Splitting the Split: How Bihar Mahagathbandhan Weakens Itself by Excluding AIMIM

The Mahagathbandhan’s refusal to accommodate AIMIM represents a self-inflicted wound, writes Asad Ashraf.

By refusing to engage with AIMIM, the Mahagathbandhan risks signalling to Muslims that their political voice is acceptable only when filtered through established parties

(Photo: The Quint)

As Bihar gears up for its next Assembly election, the familiar drama of alliances, defections, and negotiations has begun to unfold.

At the heart of this churn lies a telling paradox: the Mahagathbandhan—comprising the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Congress, and the Left—has long accused Asaduddin Owaisi’s All India Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (AIMIM) of splitting the secular vote. Yet today, by refusing to accommodate AIMIM within its ranks, the alliance itself is ensuring precisely that outcome.

This is not merely a matter of electoral arithmetic. The exclusion of AIMIM speaks to deeper contradictions in the way the Mahagathbandhan conceives of secular politics, manages identity-based mobilisation, and relates to Bihar’s Muslims. If left unaddressed, it could cost the alliance at the ballot box and in its long-term credibility.

The Irony of Exclusion

For years, AIMIM has been painted by its rivals as a spoiler, a party that eats into the Muslim vote and indirectly aids the BJP. In Bihar’s 2020 Assembly election, AIMIM surprised many by winning five seats in the Seemanchal region, though defections later reduced its strength. Even so, its ability to draw support in Muslim-dominated constituencies has been acknowledged.

Now, AIMIM’s Bihar unit, led by Akhtarul Iman, has formally appealed to join the Mahagathbandhan, citing the need to prevent precisely this division of votes. Yet the alliance, instead of embracing the offer, has responded with suspicion and cold shoulders.

The irony is inescapable: in the name of protecting the secular vote, the Mahagathbandhan is engineering its division. By sidelining AIMIM, it is virtually ensuring that opposition votes will split in key constituencies—handing an advantage to the BJP-led NDA.

One of the main arguments made against AIMIM is that it engages in identity politics, positioning itself as the authentic voice of Muslims. Critics claim that such a strategy risks polarisation and weakens the broader secular plank.

But this charge cannot withstand scrutiny when levelled by the RJD, the dominant force in the Mahagathbandhan. Since its inception, the RJD has built its base around the “M-Y” formula of Muslims and Yadavs. Its political appeal has been rooted in precisely the same identity-based mobilisation that it now discredits in AIMIM.

The truth is that every party in Bihar leans on identity politics of some form, whether caste, community or region.

The JD(U) mobilises Kurmi support; the Congress courts upper castes and minorities; the Left draws on class as well as caste identities. To single out AIMIM as uniquely guilty of identity politics is therefore less a principled stance than a selective one.

If the Mahagathbandhan accepts identity politics when it benefits its core vote banks, but rejects it when it comes from AIMIM, it exposes a fundamental hypocrisy.

The Message to Muslims

The deeper problem with this exclusion lies in the message it sends to Bihar’s Muslims. For a community that has faced repeated marginalisation and violence, AIMIM represents a party that speaks unapologetically about their concerns. Whether or not one agrees with Owaisi’s methods, his appeal among sections of Muslims is real.

By refusing to engage with AIMIM, the Mahagathbandhan risks signalling to Muslims that their political voice is acceptable only when filtered through established parties like RJD or Congress. This feeds the perception of tokenism: Muslim votes are welcome, but Muslim representation outside the boundaries set by traditional parties is not.

In the short term, this may cost the alliance some seats. In the long term, it risks disillusioning Muslim voters altogether. Over time, it is not AIMIM that will feel most alienated, but the Muslim electorate itself, which may begin to question the sincerity of alliances that claim to embody secular politics while sidelining the very party that openly seeks to represent them.

The Long-Term Costs

From a purely electoral standpoint, the decision also looks like a miscalculation. Bihar’s politics is defined by narrow margins. In such a context, even a few percentage points of votes shifting one way or another can decide dozens of constituencies. AIMIM may not have statewide reach, but in its pockets of influence—particularly in Seemanchal—it can tilt the balance.

By keeping AIMIM out, the Mahagathbandhan is essentially surrendering these constituencies to contestation, with the high likelihood that votes will split. The outcome is predictable: BJP or NDA candidates slipping through the middle. This is precisely the scenario the alliance claims it wants to avoid. Yet, by refusing to accommodate AIMIM, it has chosen the very path that guarantees it.

The risks extend beyond the immediate election. If AIMIM is consistently excluded, it will have no choice but to build an independent base. Over time, this could strengthen the party’s hold in minority-dominated regions, permanently reducing the Mahagathbandhan’s influence there.

Worse, AIMIM could become the nucleus of a third front, drawing in other smaller or disaffected parties. Even if such a front does not win power, it could further fragment the opposition space, weakening the ability of secular parties to challenge the BJP.

In this scenario, the Mahagathbandhan’s refusal to engage AIMIM would not only be a tactical mistake but a strategic blunder with long-lasting repercussions.

A Self-Inflicted Wound

To be fair, the Mahagathbandhan’s concerns are not entirely unfounded. Bringing AIMIM into the fold would complicate seat-sharing arrangements, forcing established parties to cede constituencies. Some leaders also worry that AIMIM’s rhetoric could alienate non-Muslim voters and hand the BJP a polarising plank.

But these challenges are hardly insurmountable. Seat-sharing disputes are part and parcel of coalition politics and can be resolved through negotiation. The alliance could, for instance, restrict AIMIM’s role to constituencies in Seemanchal where it has proven strength. As for fears of polarisation, it is questionable whether voters are as swayed by elite labels as party strategists assume. What often matters more is whether their immediate concerns—jobs, governance, representation, are being addressed.

In other words, the costs of including AIMIM are negotiable. The costs of excluding it are structural and potentially devastating.

Ultimately, the Mahagathbandhan’s refusal to accommodate AIMIM represents a self-inflicted wound. It claims to champion secular unity but practises selective exclusion. It accuses AIMIM of splitting the vote but, by keeping it out, ensures that very outcome.

This contradiction undermines the alliance’s credibility and risks alienating the very communities whose support it depends upon. By narrowing the field instead of broadening it, the Mahagathbandhan has weakened its own hand against the BJP.

If the alliance is serious about presenting itself as a grand alternative, it must move beyond its insecurities and make space for new players, however uncomfortable the adjustments may be. Otherwise, it will continue to repeat the same cycle: blaming others for division while sowing the seeds of its own fragmentation.

And in that failure, it is not only AIMIM that loses. It is Bihar’s secular politics itself that pays the price.

(Asad Ashraf is an independent journalist. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed are the author's own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)