INS Surat, Nilgiri, and Vagsheer: Triumphs & Trials of Indian-Built War Vessels

Tri-commissioning of war vessels built by a single yard is a matter of timing, and not a measure of yard efficiency.

The significance of the event is underwritten by the fact that it was presided over than none other than Prime Minister Narendra Modi, writes Rear Admiral Monty Khanna (Retd).

(Photo: PTI)

15 January 2025 will go down as a red-letter day in the history of the Indian Navy with three major war vessels – the destroyer INS Surat, the frigate INS Nilgiri, and the submarine INS Vagsheer – getting commissioned simultaneously.

What’s more, all the three vessels are Indian-built, in fact built in the same shipyard – Mazagaon Docks Limited (MDL).

The significance of the event is underwritten by the fact that it was presided over than none other than Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the tri-commissioning of the three war vessels in Mumbai on 15 January. 

(Photo: PTI)

Events such as these play a significant role in highlighting our shipbuilding prowess, and in a larger sense, enhancing the overall maritime consciousness of the nation.

While not in any way undermining the significance of the event, it is also good to do a reality check on the run up to this event.

A Reality Check

INS Surat is a Type 15B Visakhapatnam Class 7,400-tonne guided missile destroyer. The contract for building four of the class was placed on MDL in January 2011 on nomination basis. Construction commenced soon after, with the keel of the first hull, Visakhapatnam, being laid on 12 October 2013. The vessel was finally commissioned on 21 November 2021 after a duration of about eight years from keel laying.

In the case of the Surat, keel laying took place on 7 November 2019 with commissioning on 15 January 2025, an impressive overall reduction in duration by 36 percent with concerted effort from yard and the naval overseeing staff.

INS Nilgiri is the first ship of the seven-ship Type 17A frigate programme that was accorded approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security in February 2015. Contracts were placed soon after on two public sector yards – Mazagaon Docks for four hulls, and Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) Ltd for the remaining three. Keel laying of INS Nilgiri took place on 28 December 2017.

She was launched on 28 September 2019 and commissioned on 15 January 2025. The build period from keel laying to commissioning amounts to seven years and 18 days. Chinese shipyards are achieving the same in well under three years.

INS Vagsheer is the sixth and final submarine of the six Scorpene Class submarines that were contracted to MDL and DCNS in October 2005. Steel cutting for INS Kalveri, the first of the class, began on 14 December 2006 with commissioning on 14 December 2017 after 11 years. The comparative time period for Vagsheer amounts to about 13 and a half years, a substantial increase in time taken.

Mixed Signals on India's Shipbuilding Capabilities

Simultaneous commissioning of vessels built by a single yard is a matter of timing – and not a measure of yard efficiency. The background above gives us mixed signals on India’s shipbuilding capabilities.

While it instills confidence on our ability to make complex state-of-the-art ships, we fall short when it comes to the overall time taken for their construction, a factor that also carries cost implications.

The reasons for this are manifold but one can highlight a few of them.

Both our primary shipyards engaged in construction of destroyers and frigates, that is, MDL and GRSE, were built at a time when the displacement of such ships tended to be less than 2,000 tonnes. Further, even for larger vessels, modular construction – a methodology in which all the parts that go inside a ship are placed inside smaller modules which are progressively mated to make the larger vessel – all done prior to launch, was non-existent.

As a consequence, the weight of the ship at the time of launch was invariably a small fraction of the final weight – and was not a constraint for the relatively shallow waters that abut the two yards.

With the size of vessels progressively growing, a completed destroyer now having a displacement in excess of 7,000 tonnes, the launch weight has become a large constraint. This places restrictions on the quantum of pre-outfitting that can be done on a vessel prior to launch from a slipway, a process that requires deep waters to ensure that the hull does not get damaged by grazing the seabed as it slides down the ramp into the water.

Nilgiri, for example, at the time of her launch had a displacement of less than 50 percent of her final weight. The global norm today for launch weight is above 80 percent.

Putting parts into a ship after she is afloat is an expensive, inefficient, and time-consuming way to build ships. Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions.

Capital dredging of waters around the yards and of a passage to deeper waters is expensive to do and difficult to maintain. A far better solution is either to relocate the yard to a location that has access to deeper waters, as China has done for several of their shipyards, or to build/acquire a subsidiary in deep waters for construction of larger vessels while using the current facilities for smaller ships.

The other issue relates to increasing yard productivity through the reduction of overheads. One of the means to do so is through consolidation of shipyards, at least the government-owned ones, under a single management so as to optimise the loading of each and to reduce unwanted duplication in terms of machinery, infrastructure, and manpower. Consolidation has been the norm across many parts of the globe – the China State Shipbuilding Company and Russia’s United Shipbuilding Corporation being prime examples.

While we pay kudos to our yards for building state-of-the-art ships, it is important that they are also coaxed to undertake reforms to ensure that taxpayer money is optimally utilised for meeting the nation's requirements of maritime security.

(The author is former Assistant Military Adviser in the National Security Council Secretariat. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)