Delhi: BJP Had Something to Offer Everyone, AAP Had Little to Offer Anyone

Beneath the mask of Delhi's cosmopolitanism, caste and communal considerations transcend other electoral equations.

Arvind Kejriwal's AAP has lost the Delhi Assembly elections after over two decades.

(Photo: The Quint)

Beneath the mask of Delhi's cosmopolitanism, caste and communal considerations still transcend all other electoral equations. The BJP has succeeded in offering something to everyone. AAP, meanwhile, had little to offer even to those who have supported them through and through. 

The results of the Delhi Assembly elections have vindicated the credibility of many exit polls. Delhi has delivered a verdict that, until 8 February, seemed impossible to Arvind Kejriwal and his supporters. 

The three-term former Delhi CM has faced the most significant upset of his career, declining to 22 seats after two back-to-back thumping wins that made him look invincible. After a 27-year-long wait, the BJP is set to return to power with 48 seats in the Delhi Assembly. Every AAP bigwig, except Delhi CM Atishi, has lost their seat. 

Even the AAP convener, Arvind Kejriwal, and his deputy, Manish Sisodia, couldn't defend their seats. While it would be too early to write off Arvind Kejriwal despite his formidable fortress crumbling beneath his feet, these results have exposed the limitations of his Aam Aadmi brand of populist politics. 

The 'Post-Ideology' Politics That Didn't Work

Firstly, this massive blow might mark the beginning of the end of AAP's “post-ideology” politics.

Kejriwal won in 2013 and 2015 due to the massive anti-incumbency against Sheila Dikshit's Congress government. Initially, he sold idealism and promised to alter the very foundation of Indian politics. His USP was a corruption-free and educated leadership with a strong welfare agenda. It helped him gain support from all quarters of the city. 

Subsequently, AAP positioned itself — or was rather gradually reduced — to a party of cheap service providers. They offered cheap electricity, water, and other bare-minimum essentials that serve as the lifeblood of the city's poor. With the downfall of the Congress, the city's marginalized communities — Muslims and Dalits — saw AAP as the new alternative. 

However, a big chunk of the BJP’s Lok Sabha voters also saw a leader in Kejriwal, at least at the Assembly level. In fact, in 2015, AAP is alleged to have wooed them with the proposal, “Lok Sabha mein Modi, Vidhan Sabha mein Kejriwal.” Subsequently, AAP adopted what some commentators described as “soft-Hindutva” to appease this group. 

AAP supported the Modi government’s stand on Article 370. Its leaders proposed replacing Mahatma Gandhi’s image on currency notes with those of Hindu deities. On some occasions, they made anti-Muslim dog whistles. They remained silent on hate assemblies arguing that they lack police control. AAP’s stand during the 2020 riots in North-East Delhi, the witch-hunt of the Tablighi Jamaat, and its comments after the Jahangirpuri demolitions were frequently mentioned by Muslim voters in interactions with journalists—even if they voted for AAP.

Moreover, it was AAP that brought the issue of Rohingyas and illegal Bangladeshis into its campaign this time to attack and corner the BJP. Therefore, to call this win a victory of hate politics would be a knee-jerk reading of the result. 

Barring a few exceptions, the BJP, in fact, managed to dial down its Hindutva agenda. This was their least communal campaign in any state election in recent memory. To begin with, this election was unlike the 2020 Delhi elections, where Muslim voters felt they were in a do-or-die situation. There was no such compulsion this time.

While Muslims have largely stayed behind AAP, their support has begun to slowly slip away. Owaisi's Sangh ka chhota recharge (Sangh’s B Team) nomenclature for Kejriwal has spread far and wide. From my interactions with many Muslims, especially the youth in Okhla and North-East Delhi, it’s clear that they don’t like Kejriwal — even if they still vote for AAP since the others in opposition are too weak at the moment. 

With the BJP toning down its aggressive Hindutva campaigns in Delhi, it ensured some transfer of Muslim votes to Congress and AIMIM this time. In Mustafabad, this silence perhaps helped the BJP. In Okhla, even if Amanatullah Khan managed to win, his margin has significantly decreased. Despite the disenchantment, AAP has performed well on seats with significant Muslim population.

Meanwhile, with its sharp attack on Kejriwal's anti-corruption crusader image and its focus on the Sheesh Mahal issue, the BJP ensured that its floating middle-class Lok Sabha voters moved away from Kejriwal in the Delhi assembly elections.

Over the past two years, Kejriwal and several senior AAP leaders were arrested in the alleged liquor policy scam, which further undermined the party’s image.

Unsurprisingly, the middle class — who once echoed AAP’s “Lok Sabha mein Modi, Vidhan Sabha mein Kejriwal” — was the first to abandon him.

Plenty Welfare Promises, Fulfilled Only Some

The BJP vowed not to end AAP’s policies, maintaining that they would offer even more. Simultaneously, they escalated their attack on AAP’s welfare agenda and freebie politics.

This helped the BJP broaden the class divide in its favor. AAP also failed to fulfill many of its promises — some partly due to its troubled relationship with the LG and some due to their own failure. The BJP positioned itself as a party that would end this daily tug-of-war, which annoyed many voters. 

Unlike the BJP, AAP’s relationship with this set of voters was entirely transactional—like a customer-business agreement. So, the sudden shift was easy. To its credit, the BJP also understood what this group needed, largely focusing on civic issues, governance, and the alleged corruption of the AAP government throughout its campaign. 

While it is true that AAP failed to address issues like pollution, saying that this is the reason they lost the election would be too charitable to the Delhi electorate. Ultimately, all election results in India boil down to organizational strength, money, candidate choices, and caste.

The BJP, as we know, has the best organizational strength among all parties. No party — especially those without a cadre or strong ideological base — can match them in spreading their message and agenda. The BJP was open to accepting AAP leaders from different caste backgrounds to strengthen its hold. 

AAP, on the other hand, has shown little desire to defend its own leaders like Tahir Hussain or Rajendra Pal Gautam.

Ironically, the BJP showed no hesitation in offering a seat to Priyanka Gautam despite opposition from its hardline supporters and influencers. From Purvanchalis to Uttarakhandis, the BJP had a strong outreach plan for all.

They reached out to Sikhs, Jats, Gujjars, and devised a clear roadmap to woo the Dalits. The BJP fielded 14 Dalit candidates. While the majority of SC-reserved seats have gone to AAP, the BJP managed to win four reserved seats after at least two decades.

Like the Muslims, the Dalits haven't totally abandoned the AAP even when their issues still haven't been addressed by the party. AAP has failed to provide effective representation to the Dalits in the Rajya Sabha, its flagship schemes for the Dalit flopped as well, and the development of their still remains neglected. But the party still needs to acknowledge their problems and resentment.

Beneath the mask of Delhi's cosmopolitanism, caste and communal considerations still transcend all other electoral equations. The BJP has succeeded in offering something to everyone. AAP, meanwhile, had little to offer even to those who have supported them through and through. What it did have—the freebies—will be appropriated and perhaps be delivered more smoothly by a bigger service provider. 

Now, it is up to the AAP to decide whether it can afford to continue to be a service provider or a political force with a clear moral commitment to its voters.

(Alishan Jafri is a journalist based in New Delhi. This is an opinion article and the views expressed are the author's own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)