At ASEAN, India Charts Course for Maritime Leadership as US-China Tensions Loom

India is not a major maritime power, though it has the characteristics to become one, writes C Uday Bhaskar.

The maritime domain is central to ASEAN and its principal interlocutors including India and PM Modi, in his virtual address to the summit, dwelt on India’s role as a credible and trusted Maritime Partner of ASEAN.

(Photo: Kamran Akhter/The Quint)

The 47th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit that took place on 26-28 October, hosted by Malaysia and chaired by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim under the theme "Inclusivity and Sustainability," brought together leaders from ASEAN's 10 member states (now expanded to 11) and key dialogue partners including the US, China, Japan, and India, among other partners.

The summit was held against the backdrop of considerable US-China tension and US-India discord over oil imports and related tariff penalties.  In what may be termed tactical prudence, PM Narendra Modi chose not to attend the summit in Kuala Lumpur and India was represented by the External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar.

ASEAN’s Symbolic Wins

The most visible political outcome for ASEAN as a group was the brief presence of US President Donald Trump, who in his trademark pattern broke protocol (did a little jig when he was received by his Malaysian host), used trade and tariffs to unsettle his interlocutors, and then whistled his way to Japan and South Korea while hinting at major deals.

It is expected that there will be a meeting between President Trump and his Chinese counterpart in South Korea on 30 October, and if there is a positive outcome and the bilateral tension is reduced, this would be welcome news for all the participants at the ASEAN deliberations.

The more significant outcomes related to the strategic and security domain were the formal induction of Timor-Leste as the 11th ASEAN member, expanding the bloc's strategic footprint.

Timor-Leste, or East Timor, is a small Southeast Asian nation (1.4 million population) occupying half the island of Timor, that was colonised by Portugal and became free in 1975. It was soon occupied by Indonesia and after a bitter and bloody struggle, East Timor finally emerged as an independent nation in 2002. Becoming part of ASEAN will enable greater economic and trade integration for this young nation and is a welcome development.

Trump’s ‘Peace Deal’ Moment

The more visible event that dominated the ASEAN summit was the peace agreement signed between Thailand and Cambodia, witnessed by US President Donald Trump, which includes withdrawing heavy weapons from the border, joint patrols, and mine clearance programs.

This agreement  has been added to the Trump list of  ‘peace deals’ that the US President has ‘brokered’ and will be highlighted as one more feather that warrants a Nobel Peace prize. Tokyo has also endorsed the Nobel for Trump.

However, two of the abiding security challenges that have bedevilled ASEAN as a group continue to fester and these include the Myanmar crisis and the maritime disputes over the South China Sea. In keeping with the ASEAN way of addressing regional issues in a delicate manner, the ASEAN summit encouraged the  military leadership in Myanmar to address the domestic political crisis through dialogue and humanitarian access, but did not censure.

The summit did address the South China Sea issue, but not in a definitive manner. The Chairman's Statement, as in the past, reaffirmed the bloc's commitment to upholding peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. 

Predictably, ASEAN leaders welcomed progress made in ongoing negotiations toward a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea, seen as a legally binding instrument to ensure peace and manage competing claims among regional powers, including China. But Beijing continues to advance its claims backed by aggressive maritime/naval intimidation and the China-Philippines clashes are case in point.

India’s Maritime Push and ASEAN Partnership

The maritime domain is central to ASEAN and its principal interlocutors including India and PM Modi, in his virtual address to the summit, dwelt on India’s role as a credible and trusted Maritime Partner of ASEAN.

The emphasis was on India's Act East Policy and the broader vision of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific - underscoring maritime cooperation as a cornerstone of the India-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Modi announced a major maritime initiative to intensify joint efforts with ASEAN, saying,

"India has stood firmly with its ASEAN friends in every crisis. Our cooperation in HADR (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief),  maritime security, and the blue economy is growing rapidly. In light of this, we are declaring 2026 as the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation."

Narendra Modi

The maritime domain of the extended region is now subsumed in the strategic geography of the Indo-Pacific and India has supported the centrality of ASEAN. Further, Delhi has burnished its profile as a security partner at the lower end of the  scale, especially in relation to HADR and maritime pollution exigencies.

A core concern for ASEAN is that while it is dependent on China for trade and economic progress, it is wary of the creeping maritime assertiveness of Beijing  and seeks to hedge its security options. The US is the most obvious choice and countries like the Philippines are enhancing their bilateral military ties with Washington. Yet as a block, ASEAN does not want to be caught in the spiral of rising China-US tensions – particularly over Taiwan.

China has its own anxieties related to the maritime domain and fears that the Malacca dilemma (China’s dependence on the sea lines of communication) can be stoked by its adversaries – with the US in the lead. The Quad grouping comprising the US, Japan, Australia and India irks Beijing, which sees it as a potential naval alliance with an anti-China focus.

The AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) joint program to provide nuclear propelled submarines to Canberra which was initiated by President Joe Biden has recently been supported by Trump and China sees this as the thin end of the naval wedge.

India remains a critical swing state, along with Japan in shaping the strategic contours of the Indo-Pacific and much will depend on how the Trump-Xi meeting unspools.

From SAGAR to ‘Mahasagar’

PM Modi is to be commended for remaining invested in the maritime domain  and his first major policy statement was in relation to SAGAR in 2015. This acronym with its lyrical overtones (sagar is sea in sanskrit)  envisioned Security and Growth for All in the Indian ocean Region and this has  since been expanded to ‘mahasagar’ (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), the word for ocean in sanskrit.

Currently, India is hosting the India Maritime week in Mumbai and Home Minister Amit Shah has noted, "It is India's maritime moment. The structural reforms by the Modi government  have made India a global maritime power."

While India has been endowed with a very favourable maritime geography (unlike China) and the Modi vision to realise India’s maritime potential is laudable, the reality is more modest.

India is not a major maritime power, though it has the characteristics to become one. Composite maritime power is a judicious mix of hard military/naval capability complemented by the trade and commerce strand that includes  merchant shipping tonnage, shipbuilding, ports etc.

The US and China lead the global naval power listing and India remains a highly competent but modest naval power due to structural  funding  constraints.

As regards the ship-building, trade and commerce strands in the Indo-Pacific region,  nations like Japan, South Korea, Singapore. and UAE have a more robust and persuasive maritime profile  than India.

Yes, India has the potential to become a credible maritime power but it is yet to be realised. Hopefully the 2026 maritime cooperation agenda with ASEAN outlined by Modi may act as the trigger but a lot of hard work and sustained all-of-government commitment are called for.

(C Uday Bhaskar is a leading expert on strategic affairs. He is currently Director, Society for Policy Studies. This is an opinion piece. All views expressed are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)