Exploring China's BRI Influence in South Asia: A Book Review

Sanjay Pulipaka's 'Tiger with Wings' dissects China’s BRI in South Asia—deep and full of policy-relevant insights.

The author questions China’s claims not to interfere in internal affairs, citing ‘a perception that China sought to influence foreign policy.’

(Image: Aroop Mishra/The Quint)

Tiger with Wings: China’s BRI and Economic Engagement in South Asia by Sanjay Pulipaka provides not only an overview of Chinese presence in South Asia, but investigates it in exhaustive and densely referenced detail. It can be used as a foundational reference for examining this topic: there is valuable statistical information on South Asian countries’ strategies, economics, and politics.

After a useful introduction, it deals with each country, including Afghanistan and Myanmar but excludes Bhutan—unfortunate because China may not have infrastructure projects in Bhutan but its influence is considerable below the obvious level, to India’s obvious discomfiture. Pulipaka examines China’s claim to "never interfere in internal affairs, seek selfish interests and never pursue so-called sphere of influence." China’s belief in non-alliance remains untested in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), though "...BRI projects are ideologically agnostic."

The author questions China’s claims not to interfere in internal affairs, citing "a perception that China sought to influence foreign policy."

BRI: Strategic Infrastructure or Domestic Solution?

The BRI was essentially to address China’s domestic issues, to benefit its western provinces, provide employment to workers, add new markets and help with production overcapacity. It sought to connect "ports, roads and rail networks", overcoming natural barriers.

The BRI is constantly evolving, and while the capital involved may be hard to discern, what is undoubted is that China is the only country with the financial, commodity, and manpower resources to service this gigantic worldwide project.

Countries like the US, Japan, and India are dissenters—have tried, but are unable to contest China’s unique capabilities, including the offer of a Digital Silk Road of optical fibre networks linking China to other countries "to build a community of common destiny," and a Space Silk Road enabling China to provide navigation satellite systems.

There is a nascent Health Silk Road that Pulipaka claims helped China deflect questions about the origins of COVID-19. China also dominates the undersea cable business.

Pakistan and China: Allies Beyond Economics

For Pakistan, Chinese policy in its security is more important than economic benefits. India’s neighbours seek to balance asymmetry of power with India by leaning to China. This chapter is the longest, but Pakistan is China’s long-standing ally with substantial GDP, territory, population, and military, and is Muslim without critique about China’s Muslims.

The Karakoram Highway was the first significant entry of China in the region, envisaging road, rail, energy, fibre optic, and access to the sea. Pakistan has not succeeded in eliciting other investors in it.

Pakistan’s trade deficit with China continues to be high, failing to secure more equitable bilateral engagement, equipment, raw materials or skills. There is dependence on imported coal, and BRI has not prevented its regular appeals to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and elsewhere. Expensive security has to be provided by the host, especially in Baluchistan.

Afghanistan: China’s High-Risk Economic Bet

The Afghan chapter also notes China’s anxiety to obviate Muslim criticism of its Uighur problem. By mid-2023, over 20 Chinese companies were in Afghanistan investing over $2 billion. Railway networks are important for a landlocked country and one China-Afghanistan line is operational.

Overall, says the author, "China has initiated a full-spectrum economic engagement’ including mining, connectivity projects, trade and disaster management. Pulipaka pertinently writes ‘only a country with broader geopolitical objectives would consider investing in such an environment." This applies to both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Strategic Ports and Projects in Sri Lanka and Maldives

China’s interest in Sri Lanka is due to Sri Lanka’s location close to shipping routes and growing international trade. As relationships matured, it received military and diplomatic support.

The emphasis is on infrastructure and port development, notably Hambantota, despite ‘an opinion’ that the project was financially unviable and undermined Sri Lanka’s economic independence.

There is a Chinese-built industrial zone and international airport that are under-used, a power plant dependent on imported coal, highways, and real estate including Colombo port and Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on reclaimed land, raising ‘questions about financial viability, accountability and environmental impact…there is a strong opinion in Sri Lanka that it plunged into crisis because of its ties with China’—though its massive corruption problems pre-date the BRI.

China’s activities cause security concern in India due to their impact on Colombo’s decision-making and ‘considerable international opprobrium.’ The author urges Sri Lanka to learn warnings from other South Asian nations, which applies to Maldives where its economy depends on tourism increasingly by Chinese visitors.

Debt, Infrastructure, and Diplomacy in Maldives and Nepal

Maldives is not a big market, financially nor a transit hub, but is strategic in the Indian Ocean. Its relationship with China and India appears to oscillate as each president changes. It leases islands to China and "generated concerns among countries such as India" and "some segments of Maldivian society" and the IMF about debt burden and lack of transparency. China declined debt relief for fears of "similar demands from other BRI participants."

As usual, Chinese companies constructed infrastructure, bridges, housing and energy projects compared to India’s low-cost but critical infrastructure.

Nepal again is consequential for its geography and historic links with Tibet. China has a "diversity of projects and a multisector presence." A China-constructed industrial park resulted in local protests about compensation for displacement, but infrastructure and connectivity projects like highways construction continued usually ahead of schedule—unlike similar Indian ones mired in red tape and not even begun when Chinese ones were completed. The Kaladan project in Mizoram/Myanmar, started seven years ago and nowhere near completion, is a case in point.

Citing unsourced ‘reports’, airports built by China are under-utilised due to high operating costs. Energy projects where China has the "technology, finances and expertise" depend on India as buyer, which is not forthcoming; nor is India amenable to transiting Chinese project energy to Bangladesh.

China’s Investment Footprint in Bangladesh

China’s entry into Bangladesh began with export of arms. As elsewhere, Bangladesh’s interest in China was to avoid power asymmetry with India. Chinese enterprises as usual comprised infrastructure, transport, energy and digital enterprises.

China is a major investor in power though payment due for coal imports caused blackouts from the Payra plant.

Wind farms are also established. Chinese activity caused resentment from local communities and debt-related anxieties. China is Bangladesh’s leading trade partner but like India’s ties with Bangladesh, there is little benefit to Bangladesh exports.

Myanmar: The Strategic Frontier of BRI

In Myanmar, bordering relatively underdeveloped Southwest China and important as a link to the Bay of Bengal and ASEAN, with little international competition, China has provided arms and diplomatic support at the UN. Two pipelines carry oil and gas to Yunnan, an SEZ has been set up near Yangon, but the 2021 coup and violent opposition to the army cause China anxiety. China has multi-sector activity in Myanmar and is the largest trade partner but keeps contact with all main ethnic groups including those engaged in anti-army militancy.

The "perception is that China is disproportionately benefitting", and there have been protests against hydroelectric projects; nevertheless, power lines and the New Yangon City project proceed.

While China’s support bolsters the army, it is unhappy with Myanmar’s unwillingness to act against criminal gangs and instability on the China-Myanmar border.

The Chinese economic–political involvement and significant influence have ‘not contributed to political stability.’ China brokered some ceasefires but the author’s conclusion is that China disfavours the collapse of army rule for fear it may give rise to Western entry.

India-China Economic Ties and Strategic Competition

The most balanced and objective chapter is on India. China is the second largest trade partner comprising 15 percent of Indian exports though only 4 percent of Chinese exports. Various politically inspired Indian bans and inconsistent policies add to China’s problems. Indian exports find it hard to penetrate the Chinese market due to non-tariff barriers and regulations. Leading Indian exports are rice, cotton, iron ore, copper products and seafood.

India fears artificially low-priced Chinese imports and Indian job losses, prompting China to consider manufacturing in India where Chinese solar energy products are prominent. Chinese investment priorities are in fintech and tech start-ups, but not India’s priority, and some Chinese firms are accused of financial irregularities.

Chinese firms avoid Indian infrastructure investment involving long-term commitment due to India’s stop-go policies and China lies 21st among foreign investors.

India, which has a declared policy against the BRI because it traverses Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and is a national initiative and ‘not a genuine multilateral initiative.’ Above all, India views China through a ‘competitive lens’.

Debt, Diplomacy and the Future of BRI

Former US President Joe Biden described the BRI as a ‘debt and noose agreement.’ Pulipaka claims Sri Lanka was "not fully aware of the obligations" of the Colombo Port City project and suggests that Chinese United Nations support "perhaps... often came at a price which included contracts to Chinese firms." He notes the "tremendous hunger for connectivity projects in developing countries" and lack of transparency in procurement, higher prices and debt burden since China does not require financial viability, environmental, and market impact studies.

But he concludes that the BRI being only a decade old, it may be wise to defer judgement to allow it to demonstrate its positive aspects.

He concludes with an intriguing question as to whether the large number of personnel sent abroad for BRI influence domestic thinking when they return about the scepticism and cynicism they may have encountered about China and whether that would affect the ‘little demand for change in the political process’ and society.

Construction of the Book, and Pulipaka as the Author

The construction of the book is helpful, each chapter with an introduction and conclusion. The editing is excellent with few typos. The chapter headings give insights into the chapter itself. James Mayall in his introduction uses the term ‘fair-minded’ twice, but Pulipaka’s objectivity could be questionable.

He assumes local distrust of China based on hearsay and casts doubt on recipient countries’ self-interest in resisting debt traps, lack of assistance to local economy, security, white-elephant projects and lack of consultation and transparency.

There are, states Pulipaka, projects rejected by recipients or protested by locals, and he cites cases in support. But Chinese goods are hardly "flooding the Indian market" as alleged and country-wise trade deficits are unimportant; it is only the overall trade balance that is important. Chinese influence in the domestic politics of South Asia is overrated.

China’s Economic Crisis and Unanswered Questions on BRI Impact

Chinese economic growth, he claims, lacks ingredients of an independent financial market and suffers from opaque political direction, lack of viability assessments; impressive progress is despite corruption and unfair trade practices; consumption-led economy has not replaced investment-led growth.

Like others, he repeats that China is "witnessing a severe economic crisis" citing ageing population, "limitations of an investment-led model", and financial crisis, though this catastrophe still remains a mirage. He cites ‘strong opinion’ that Chinese statistics are inflated and often uses the word ‘reportedly’.

Financial viability by BRI road/rail is questioned against sea transportation, and he sees no benefit to human development because recipients did not change economic management practices; "enhanced engagement with China cannot be a substitute for major reforms."

Yet, do the Chinese deserve credit for pioneering ‘BRI investments that enabled Chinese firms to access new markets, ensured a steady stream of raw materials, and allowed China to gain strategically important ports and airports [and] to develop deep networks of influence in many participant countries?’ Is there no merit in being an insignificant economic factor 35 years ago to becoming by far the world’s second-largest economy? These remain necessary but awkward questions to be examined.

[Tiger with Wings: China’s BRI and Economic Engagement in South Asia by Sanjay Pulipaka has been published by KW Publishers 2025, and is priced at Rs 1,343.]

(Krishnan Srinivasan is a former foreign secretary and author of several fiction and non-fiction books. This is an opinion piece and the view's expressed are the author's own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)