Not a Smart Move
- No reasons have been given behind the move of shutting down the Aviation Research Centre (ARC) at a time when the security situation is worsening
- A number of case studies prove that abrupt ‘reorganisation’ of security systems can have an adverse impact on national security
- Demands of the IAF to merge Aviation Research Centre should be rejected since ARC was created as a separate division after the 1962 Chinese war
- ARC was supposed to be a competitive intelligence and operational arm when regular institutions failed
A national daily recently reported that the Aviation Research Centre, the covert air arm of our external intelligence agency (RAW) would be shut down and its electronic assets and aircraft distributed between the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and the Air Force. I hope this report is not correct.
No reasons have been given why this move is being contemplated at a time when our internal and external security situations have worsened considerably. The report says that this move is aimed at enhancing “intelligence-gathering on China’s military capacities in the Tibet plateau, by integrating satellite-based data gathered by the NTRO with aircraft-based imaging conducted by the ARC.” Surely China is not our only threat.
The report added that the 2012 Naresh Chandra Committee had recommended merging the air wing with RAW. It was “a recommendation that emerged from complaints that the NTRO was not meeting its needs”. Even in March 2014 we heard similar complaints from Sukhma district in Chhattisgarh where Maoists killed 15 policemen, that the police were finding it difficult to coordinate with NTRO’s $220-million worth drone fleet to locate Maoist formations.
Misplaced Confidence on NTRO
The report complained about the time lag in receiving NTRO alerts. Has the situation improved so dramatically that the government is now able to repose so much of confidence in NTRO which, according to published information, was struggling to overcome its teething operational problems and staff squabbles?
We have any number of case studies to prove that abrupt “reorganisation” of security systems could result in total confusion and wholesale impairment of national security. A 2008 study by the US Directorate of National Intelligence concluded that the post-World War II demobilisation of photo interpretation capability was the biggest handicap when the US went to war in Korea in 1950.
Human and organisational assets that were painstakingly collected during WW-II for imagery intelligence with British help were gone. “For the first two months of the conflict, a single reconnaissance technical squadron in Yokota, Japan, had to handle all photo interpretation work for the US army and air force in Korea.”
Another study in 2002 by the US National War College on frequent “intelligence reforms” found that “some of the reform initiatives wanted to get rid of duplication of collection and analysis, reduce the force structure in terms of people and collection tools, and rewire the organisation chart as an inexpensive way to accomplish change. These efforts, for the most part, weakened the best features of intelligence, including competitive analysis, covert operations, HUMINT collection, and national and tactical collection capabilities.”
Competitive Intelligence
In a large country like ours the only way for quick decision-making by policy makers is through the process of competitive intelligence on multi-dimensional security situations. Thus 26/11 attack could have been prevented had the principle of competitive intelligence analysis been practiced effectively in India and had the National Security Council, which had advance intelligence, alerted Maharashtra to take preventive measures.
As such, the demands of the IAF to merge ARC into them or of the army to absorb the SFF need to be summarily rejected. This is because ARC was part of the Directorate General of Security (DGS) created soon after the 1962 Chinese war when our armed forces could not guard our security.
Unconventional Operations
This group was created for special intelligence gathering and for unconventional security operations. It was never meant to be another unit of the army or the IAF but a competitive intelligence and operational arm at the disposal of policy makers when regular institutions failed.
Together with two other wings (SSB and SSF), they did yeomen service in enhancing national security by guarding our borders from the air as well as on land and by conducting special intelligence operations. In course of time, DGS extended its security shield into other areas when terrorism exploded due to external provocation.
The DGS then started physical protection of sensitive areas, protective gear for high personages, taking over temporary charge of the personal security of the prime minister after Indira Gandhi was assassinated, training the fledgling SPG and NSG for special responsibilities and several other sensitive missions. They are now involved very heavily in the prime minister’s protection when he is on the move. All these are not visible for the common man.
The question is, do we want to rely on our long-tested and experienced security arrangement and or do we want to experiment with changes just for the sake of changing the old order?
(The writer is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, and also member of the High Level Committee which enquired into the police performance during 26/11 Mumbai)
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