On 25 April, the Ministry of External Affairs announced the appointment of former Army Chief General Dalbir Singh Suhag as the next High Commissioner to Seychelles. This appointment is aimed at deepening India-Seychelles military ties, as the latter is a country of strategic importance to India.
Although Seychelles – with a fair sized population of Indian descent – has longstanding ties with India, the growing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has obligated India to take substantial steps to safeguard its strategic interests in the region.
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Seychelles’ Strategic Importance
Seychelles, comprising 115 small islands in the south-western part of the Indian Ocean, is located between 1300 and 1800 kms off the coast of East Africa. It is a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society with people of British, Chinese, French, Indian and Iranian origin. During the 18th and early part of the 19th century, in absence of the Suez Canal, maritime traffic between Europe and Asia had to navigate below the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa).
The British thus, took possession of Seychelles in 1811, on account of its strategic importance.
Although a fair amount of maritime traffic now transits through the Red Sea-Suez Canal route, Seychelles still sits near important sea lines on the Cape of Good Hope route, with Assumption Island being close to the Mozambique Channel. In addition, is the value of some of its islands as a “static aircraft carrier” to an outside-IOR power, akin to what Diego Garcia is to the USA.
China’s Looming Presence & Pursuits in the Indian Ocean Region
Since 2001, China has been gradually increasing its footprint in the IOR. It first developed Gwadar port (Pakistan), and later, Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Kyaukphu and Sittwe (east coast of Myanmar). It has also set up an oil farm at Fujairah (UAE) and recently, a military base at Djibouti (Horn of Africa).
All along, China had been waiting for a good pretext to deploy its naval forces to the IOR. It effectively used the June 2008 UN Resolution 1816 on maritime piracy around Somalia, to deploy a three-ship flotilla of the PLA Navy (PLAN) to the Gulf of Aden, on 26 December 2008.
It has, since, maintained a constant presence with this Anti-Piracy Task Force (APTF) by rotating ships every 180 days or so, thereby gaining invaluable experience by operating alongside other navies.
In 2011, China obtained a 15-year exploration contract from the International Seabed Authority to prospect for poly-metallic sulphides on a 10,000 sq km seabed area of the South West Indian Ridge.
Since December 2013, China has also been sending submarines, both nuclear-powered and conventional (diesel-electric) to the IOR, with a nuclear-power attack submarine (SSN) docking in Sri Lanka in 2014, and a conventional one staying for a week at Karachi port in 2015.
Last year, China deployed a submarine to the IOR for the eighth time – a conventional one along with a rescue vessel. In 2017, it supplied Bangladesh with its two refurbished Ming Class submarines; it is also assisting the Bangladesh Navy in their basing and maintenance.
The PLAN has also been making port calls to various nations, and utilised them to project power, signal intent, host political leaders, acquire domain awareness and advertise capability.
Did China Indeed Never Consider a Military Base in Seychelles?
China had established diplomatic relations with Seychelles in 1976. However, nothing much happened till the 2007 visit of President Hu Jintao, which was the first indicator of China’s strategic interest in Seychelles.
China gifted the 500-strong Seychelles Peoples Defence Force (SPDF) with two aircraft for surveillance/anti-piracy duties, and commenced training 50 SPDF soldiers in China.
In December 2011, the Chinese Defence Minister led a 40-member military delegation to Seychelles. Simultaneously, reports emerged that Seychelles had invited Beijing to set up a military base for its APTF. The APTF rationale however did not seem logical – it was operating in/around the Gulf of Aden and receiving Operational Turn Round (OTR) at nearby bases [Djibouti, Aden (Yemen), Salalah (Oman), Karachi].
It was also evident to India that the OTR of PLAN ships deployed on APTF tasks would require a large logistics depot, and necessitate supply by aircraft and merchant/naval ships. Sensing the rising concern, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified that it was not considering a military base in Seychelles.
What China Wants
China’s export-orientated economy is heavily dependent on import of energy and raw materials, and export of finished goods, a fair amount of which transits through the Indian Ocean. China has also invested heavily in Central Asia, Middle-East and Africa. In addition is its Belt & Road Initiative (BRI).
Hence, China perceives the need to protect its (i) overseas investments and citizenry working abroad; (ii) Chinese shipping; and most importantly, (iii) it’s Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) through the IOR.
In sum, China’s extreme dependence on maritime resource access and foreign trade has turned an economic issue into a military problem. With it’s sole military base in the IOR at Djibouti situated near the military camps of the US, France, Japan, Germany and Italy, there is no doubt that China wants an exclusive, solitary military base in the Indian Ocean, which is akin to the US’ Diego Garcia.
Foreign basing – providing OTR facilities, allowing intelligence gathering, and bestowing a quick response capability – is an enabler of power projection, and is hence an established instrument for realising political, military and economic objectives.
A Chinese Military Base – But Where?
Much has been said about China establishing a military base in close proximity to India. However, across the northern IOR, the Indian military enjoys a huge advantage of ‘theatre proximity’ to the Indian landmass. If China sets up a military base in, say, Sri Lanka/Bangladesh, it will have to ensure that the base can withstand a full-fledged attack by India in the event of a war.
To ensure that such a military base survives, China would have to build overwhelming force capability there in terms of protecting it from ground, air and sea borne attack; and for this, the PLAN would require a far larger force structure. It would also be operating out of the South China Sea and across the Malacca Strait chokepoint – and the southernmost island of the Indian Andaman & Nicobar archipelago is situated almost at the mouth of the Malacca chokepoint.
Thus, India could start targeting an advancing PLAN fleet from Malacca itself. In other words, the PLAN needs a base that facilitates operational freedom in IOR – but is still beyond the Indian home advantage.
This is where Seychelles fits in. Aldabra Atoll of the Seychelles was the first choice of the UK-USA for a naval base. However, severe pressure from environmentalists forced them to opt for Diego Garcia instead. Thus, a naval facility in Seychelles, nearly equidistant from major international sea lines, and far from India, can provide the PLAN with a firm base: (i) to counter threats to its SLOC from the US Navy; (ii) to confront the Indian Navy; (iii) that facilitates synergistic collusion with the Pakistan Navy; (iv) to protect Chinese interests in Africa; (v) for Military Operations Other Than War (e.g. HADR); and (iv) intelligence gathering.
China’s Investments in Ports of ‘Friendly Countries’
Interestingly, in January 2013, the Chinese newspaper International Herald Leader, a subsidiary of the state-run Xinhua News Agency, had published a commentary regarding the right of the PLAN to establish overseas naval bases in foreign countries under 'equality, mutual benefit and friendly consultations', adding that China may not build US-style military bases, but that does not exclude establishment of a number of 'Overseas Strategic Support Bases'.
In pursuance of that objective, China has been making substantial investments globally in many ports of friendly countries. Although none appear to be solely for military use, they are, in many ways, reminiscent of the ‘coaling stations’ that colonizers of yore secured for facilitating movement of their ships to and from India.
It is worth noting that Gwadar, located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, if militarized by the PLAN in future, holds the potential of posing a threat to the USA’s NAVCENT (headquartered at Bahrain) – and this is perhaps one of the potential risks that made the US Navy establish bases outside the Persian Gulf [Djibouti; Somalia; Duqm (Oman)].
India-Seychelles Ties
A pact to develop an airstrip and a jetty on Assumption Island was first announced during the 2015 visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. However, the project stalled after a change in leadership led to the Opposition accusing the government of compromising Seychelles’ sovereignty, and the Parliament blocking the project. India however, continued supporting the SPDF, combating piracy in the waters around Seychelles, with the Foreign and Defence Ministers visiting Seychelles in 2010.
India has also engaged Seychelles through the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which aims at strengthening maritime security through naval cooperation.
India-Seychelles Agreement Will Need Close Monitoring
In 2017, to allay domestic concerns, the Seychelles government reportedly sought a revision in the Assumption Island agreement. The revised pact was apparently endorsed by India in January 2018. In March 2018 however, the classified agreement was posted online by one ‘Partu Kote’ along with a video which alleged that the Seychelles government had ‘sold off’ the island to India to build a ‘military base’.
This leak, clearly the handiwork of vested interests, was aimed at thwarting the deal. Despite this, during the June 2018 visit of Seychelles President Danny Faure to India, both nations signed six agreements and upgraded the Assumption Island deal from 10 to 20 years.
India also announced a USD 100-million credit to Seychelles for augmenting its maritime defence capabilities. Nevertheless, given the various dynamics at play, it is evident that the agreement will require close monitoring and shepherding, in order to take it to strategic fruition.
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan had famously said, “Whoever attains maritime supremacy in the Indian Ocean would be a prominent player on the international scene. Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. This Ocean is the key to the seven seas in the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters”. It does therefore seem that, an onerous task – that of helping India fulfill its destiny – awaits General DS Suhag at Seychelles.
(Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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