On Friday 26 July, the Centre deployed 100 companies of paramilitary troops - over 10,000 personnel - to the Kashmir Valley. This came on the heels of the visit of National Security Adviser Ajit Doval to the Valley. In Kashmir, this is being seen as a sign that “something big” is going to happen soon.
This could be a precursor to a change in the Narendra Modi government’s Kashmir policy.
According to a report in The Hindu, “New Delhi wants to move away from past set pieces, break political hegemonies and put different actors on the political chessboard”.
Even though the report stresses governance-related aspects of the policy –empowering local self government bodies and streamlining service-delivery – the real aims are political: To expand the BJP’s dominance in Jammu and Kashmir and to break the separatist movement in the state.
Another aim could be the pursuit of BJP’s ideological objectives in the Valley such as doing away with Article 35A.
The government doesn’t want to rock the boat as long as the Amarnath Yatra is underway, therefore most of its measures are likely to kick-start after it ends on 15 August.
According to reports, a high-level meeting has been scheduled for 15 August and several key decisions concerning Kashmir are said to be on the agenda.
Reacting to these reports, former Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah has accused the central government of trying to create panic.
Abdullah’s fears aren’t unjustified. If the BJP implements its Kashmir plan, it could potentially have harmful consequences in the Valley.
What’s Driving the Policy?
The Central government’s plan comes from three different elements: BJP’s mission to establish its government in Jammu and Kashmir, the RSS’ view of Kashmir as an ideological battleground and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval’s take-no-prisoners approach towards the Valley. A smaller added element is the pressure being put on the BJP and the RSS by Kashmiri Pandit groups.
Though coming from diverse sources, there is a convergence in the view of these three entities on what should be done in Kashmir. All these entities want a decisive push against political actors mediating the relationship between the Indian State and the people of Kashmir. This includes so-called “mainstream” as well as separatist political actors.
The RSS for instance believes that much of the concessions given to Kashmir – such as Article 370 and Article 35A – are aimed at appeasing a section of the Kashmiri elite, who need to be sidelined if the provisions are to be done away with.
There is a sense in the Sangh that so far the BJP couldn’t pursue its ideological position of doing away with special status for Kashmir due to its alliance with the National Conference during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s tenure and the People’s Democratic Party during part of Prime Minister Modi’s first term.
A section in the security establishment, led by NSA Ajit Doval, believe that New Delhi has invested far too many resources in “preserving” the separatist leadership in Kashmir and are batting for a comprehensive crackdown.
Amit Shah vs Rajnath Singh
Another reason behind the Centre’s new Kashmir policy is the difference in approach between Home Minister Amit Shah and his predecessor Rajnath Singh. Though his power was restricted by NSA Doval and the PMO, Rajnath Singh is said to have had a more cautious approach towards Kashmir during his tenure.
With Rajnath no longer at the helm, the Centre’s Kashmir policy is changing on two crucial aspects.
First, there is an increased emphasis on the influence of international terror outfits like ISIS and Al Qaeda in Kashmir. During his tenure, Rajnath Singh had, on multiple occasions, denied that ISIS has any presence in Kashmir. The new approach seeks to downplay the indigenous roots of militancy and project it as entirely part of global terrorism.
Second, Rajnath Singh had favoured the return of Kashmiri Pandits through the creation of “composite colonies”, that is colonies that aren’t exclusively for Pandits, but also have Muslim and Sikh families.
The BJP is now said to be favouring exclusive settlements for Pandits in the Valley, almost on the lines of Israel-backed Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
Both these issues reflect that the Centre might be discarding Rajnath Singh’s approach for an even more aggressive one.
What This Means for Kashmir
The main aspect of the new Kashmir policy is its desire to sideline dominant Kashmiri political actors.
As it is, several top separatist leaders like Yasin Malik, Shabir Shah, Shahidul Islam, Masrat Alam Bhat, Asiya Andrabi etc have been detained. The Enforcement Directorate and the National Investigation Agency are also likely to broaden their net in the Valley, probing not just separatist leaders but also common citizens on the suspicion of backing separatists.
But the separatists aren’t the only actors the BJP wants to weaken. The policy also applies to pro-India political parties like National Conference and People’s Democratic Party.
Nothing exemplifies the Modi government’s new policy more than Governor Satyapal Malik’s appeal asking militants to target “bureaucrats and politicians who have looted Kashmir” instead of the police and the military.
Apparently, the BJP’s plan is to delegitimise the pro-India parties like NC and PDP. The antipathy towards NC is particularly evident in the Governor’s direct attacks on the party leadership.
The end result of this targeting of separatists and mainstream parties is that it would reduce the Kashmir conflict into a tussle between militants and security forces, completely undermining civilian entities.
This also coincides with the appointment of former cop Farooq Khan as the adviser to the Jammu and Kashmir government. A controversial cop, Khan’s name is associated with several encounters that took place in Kashmir in the 1990s. It won’t be surprising if a similar policy is replicated.
Faulty Assumptions
The government’s policy appears to be based on several flawed assumptions.
It is wrong to assume that the dissatisfaction among the Kashmiri public is purely due to the failure of mainstream Kashmiri politicians or the civilian wings of the state. No doubt, the popularity of parties like NC and more so PDP is at its lowest. But this is because many Kashmiris see them as New Delhi’s cronies and not genuine representatives of the Kashmiri people. Therefore the anger against these parties is only one part of the broader dissatisfaction against the government of India.
When civilians are killed or blinded by the army or CRPF, the protests that take place aren’t directed at civilian politicians but the security forces. It is naive of the Centre and the Governor to assume that they can divert public anger towards NC, PDP and bureaucracy, without addressing the elephant in the room, that is the security forces.
The second faulty assumption is that the Centre will be able to address the public dissatisfaction in Kashmir by efficient service delivery and empowering local self government. The problem in Kashmir is a political one. It is not a governance issue that can be addressed by bringing in greater efficiency, if at all that happens.
The third wrong assumption is that all political parties are equally hated in Kashmir, and therefore if the people in the Valley can vote for PDP, NC or the Congress, they can vote for the BJP as well in the name of Bijli Sadak Pani issues. Remember, the 2014 Assembly elections witnessed a significantly high turnout in the Valley. This was because many Kashmiri Muslims, who hadn’t voted since the allegedly rigged elections of 1987, came out and voted just to defeat the BJP. The party’s espousal of Hindutva under Modi makes it a political untouchable even when compared to the Congress, which has a far longer and more troubled relationship with the Valley.
In fact it was the PDP’s decision to form a government with the BJP in the state that provided a major boost to militancy as it alienated several sections in the Valley.
The fourth problematic assumption is that the BJP can get away with any move against Article 35a or Article 370. This would be disastrous as it would pit even pro-India parties like the NC and the PDP against the Centre. In the words of Mehbooba Mufti, if Article 35a is tinkered with, “It would be difficult for those who raise the flag of this country in Kashmir to even shoulder it”.
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