Why India is in a 'Sweet Spot' Under Trump's Leadership

New Delhi realises though Trump's observations may at times seem unorthodox, they have some element of consistency.

New Delhi realises that Trump is a showman, a disruptor, a politician running on instinct and impulse, and though his observations may at times seem unorthodox if not outrageous, they have some element of consistency.

(Photo: PTI)

Despite world-wide apprehension and criticism of US President Donald Trump’s policies, observers of geopolitics could feel that by all criteria, India is at present in a ‘sweet spot’ for various reasons.

It has a stable and non-threatening neighbourhood despite some bilateral acrimony and tensions; it has friendly contacts with all major world capitals; it has a large and growing economy, a large and adequate military, a large reservoir of skilled and semi-skilled manpower resources; and its geographical location makes it an enabler both to the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is considered a friend by President Trump, and as premier, Modi has made more visits (10) to the US than to any other country.

Multilateral Engagements

Given their relative roles as a leader of the developed world and a leader of the Global South, it is important that the US and India enjoy cordial relations, even if some of their multilateral memberships are not in mutual sympathy, as in NATO, G7, BRICS, and SCO.

India attempts with unconvincing ambiguity to portray its membership of Quad as being China-neutral, and has also remained silent on the West-led sanctions regimes against Russia, Iran, and others despite their unilateral illegality. It is also silent on Israel’s genocidal attacks on Palestinians, but New Delhi’s diplomatic relations with Israel from the early 1990s was predicated on improving ties with Washington and the US Israeli lobby. In pursuing its updated version of non-alignment, India has been remarkably successful.

Trump’s loquaciousness in the media and social media have observers guessing as to his real intentions. New Delhi realises that Trump is a showman, a disruptor, a politician running on instinct and impulse, and though his observations may at times seem unorthodox if not outrageous, they have some element of consistency. In the context of his ‘America First’ doctrine, Trump indulges in a foreign policy similar to the nineteenth century Viscount Palmerston principle that a country should have no eternal allies nor eternal enemies—only eternal interests.

This accounts for his various claims on Canada, Denmark, and Panama, his indifference to Europe and NATO and his outreach to Russia—all of which can stand scrutiny in a geopolitical sense. Also akin to Palmerston’s policies, Trump’s foreign policy is based on power projection, a leverage possessed by America as the world’s biggest economy, the biggest military, and the US dollar being the basis of global financial transactions.

A Multi-Polar World

Trump’s approach introduces a new style of international politics, leading to a degree of economic, political, and military de-coupling – Freidrich Merz, Chancellor of Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, has spoken of 'independence' from the US.

The extent to which European leaders are rattled by Trump’s remarks suggest that they are considering constructing a new paradigm of economic and security cooperation. If this evaluation inclines Europe to eschew reliance on the transatlantic alliance to give greater attention to its neglected connections in Africa and Asia, this can only be to its benefit and that of India which has been waiting since 2007 for conclusion of a trade agreement with the European Union (EU).

Trump’s tariff wars will spell the end of the World Trade Organisation already rendered ineffective by his White House predecessors, while his unilateralism casts doubt on the foundational principles of the post-World War ll order, namely, the sovereignty and equality of states, territorial integrity, the rule of law; and by implication, the viability of the United Nations (UN) and other international organisations established to uphold international conduct.

Apart from the ancient era when Vijayalakshmi Pandit was president of the General Assembly, India at the UN since 1948 has perforce been cast in a defensive posture and its plausible claim, proffered since 1994, to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council has, despite strenuous and costly efforts by New Delhi, scarcely moved forward.

In regard to the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) whose leadership in perpetuity is in the control of the West, while the shareholding in these and other global financial institutions remain firmly in western hands despite the rise of China and India to greater shares of global growth, the status quo is not to India’s advantage.

While American domestic politics are further polarised by Trump, international society is likely to become more multi-polar, which is what New Delhi strives for and from which it will gain more global traction. India will benefit from a US-Russia détente and lifting of sanctions, and India has hedged its bets against its worst-case scenario of a US-China political détente by sharply reducing acrimony with our biggest neighbour with a view to encouraging, albeit in yet homeopathic doses, Chinese investment in Indian manufacture, infrastructure, and employment.

The main possible speed-breakers for India in Trump’s policy lie in the fields of tariffs and trade, and illegal immigration to the US.

Tariffs and Trade

In April, Trump set off a global economic tremor by announcing sweeping new tariffs aimed at undoing what he called “decades of unfair trade practices”.

A 10 percent tariff was levied on all countries, with Canada and Mexico notably spared. For India, a 27 percent reciprocal tariff was announced, though implementation was deferred for 90 days to allow for negotiations.

While this announcement marked the beginning of another turbulent chapter in the US trade policy, for India it could well be the start of something transformative.

While China responded with fury, a 125 percent duty on US imports and tight control over rare earth exports, India chose a measured, non-confrontational approach, which may turn out to be the more strategic one. As the US softens its stance toward China, announcing a forthcoming reduction in its own steep tariffs (albeit “not to zero”), India finds itself better placed since this moment, fraught as it is, presents a rare opportunity.

With US firms scrambling to diversify supply chains and reduce dependency on China, India could emerge as a key manufacturing partner and investment destination. Even Chinese companies in recalibrating their global operations may see value in examining production in India, not only for its vast domestic market but as a springboard to the West.

But seizing this opportunity demands more than deft diplomacy; it requires transformation. India’s regulatory bottlenecks, outdated labour laws, and fragile infrastructure are longstanding deterrents to large-scale investment. The last wave of major economic reform was over three decades ago, and today the stakes are higher, the urgency greater. Reform is no longer a choice but a dire necessity.

This is especially true as India negotiates a new Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with the US, with terms of reference agreed and Phase One expected to close by late 2025. The agreement could unlock significant opportunities in sectors like electric vehicles, petrochemicals and agriculture, if India is ready to reciprocate with market access and regulatory clarity.

Some policy voices here, such as Global Trade Research Initiative, have suggested a ‘zero for zero’ strategy — eliminating tariffs on 90 percent of industrial goods while protecting sensitive sectors like agriculture and pharma. While pragmatic, such a narrow focus risks missing the wood for the trees and a broader Free Trade Agreement or BTA along with a deeper techno-strategic alliance, would offer greater benefits.

The real promise lies beyond tariffs. India and the US have an opportunity to build a partnership anchored in deep-tech integration, from semiconductors and AI to defence tech and quantum computing.

Together, the two democracies can help shape the global digital ecosystem, champion open technology standards, and bolster economic resilience through shared innovation. This is not just about trade but aligning economic ambition with geopolitical strategy and stepping into a role to which India has aspired as a leader in the Global South, a reliable partner of the West, and an economic powerhouse in its own right.

William Shakespeare in Julius Caesar said many centuries ago:

On such a full sea are we now afloat;

And we must take the current when it serves,

Or lose our ventures.

Such is now the moment for India with the clock ticking and the world recalibrating.

The H1B visa route is under intense scrutiny with some in Trump’s administration pressing for restrictive measures, while others, including Trump and Elon Musk, supporting the role of this visa category in maintaining US competitiveness and leadership in the tech sector.

Time will show whether India’s request to raise the H1B visa ceiling from the current 85,000 to 195,000 will find favour in Washington but one positive outcome of the visa curbs has been that many American companies are investing in building Global Capability Centers in India.

Immigration Issues

A tilt to the political right was clearly revealed in the US presidential election of 2016 that brought Trump to power for the first time, and immigration is a key issue in the culture wars waged by the political right both in the US and Europe.

There are an estimated 13.3 million undocumented immigrants in the US, and Trump has threatened to introduce actions to expel about 11 million of them. There will be many court cases against implementation of this policy, not least because immigrants occupy low-paid hard-labour jobs that citizens find unattractive, such as harvesting fruit in California.

Ending birthright citizenship is part of Trump’s drive to remove illegal immigrants, which challenges the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution which states in part: "All persons born or naturalised in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States." The Trump interpretation argues that the clause excludes children of non-citizens who are in the US unlawfully. Judges in Maryland and Seattle have already blocked implementation of this presidential order.

India does not have data on the number of undocumented Indian immigrants residing in the US, but estimates range from 625,000 to 725,000, numbering third behind Mexicans and El Salvadoreans.

India does not challenge the US’ right to deport Indian nationals illegally in America; on average 1,500 were deported annually during Trump’s first term, and 682 have been deported by Trump in this term until 4 April, according to official Indian spokesmen. Deportations in humiliating circumstances has aroused public anger, which has presumably been conveyed to the US administration – though India makes great efforts to keep any disagreements with the White House away from public scrutiny.

It may be questioned why people from a nation with a bright present and better future seek perilous and expensive ways to emigrate illegally, which is a debate for another day—though it should be noted that the Indian government for long has given the impression during negotiation of trade and other agreements that facilitating emigration, even for the modestly skilled, is one of its high priorities.

While noting the benefits to India in promoting its current good relations with Trump’s America, it would nonetheless be unwise to rush to any final judgement. Trump has been in office for less than four months and it is impossible to accurately predict the course of his presidency.

Opposition will arise both at home and abroad to the style and substance of Trump’s policies, and if Trump’s early actions are a guide to the rest of his tenure, questions will arise about the viability of such policies both during and after his second four-year term is over.

(Manoj Mohanka serves on several corporate boards and Krishnan Srinivasan is a former Foreign Secretary of India. This is an opinion piece. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)