Mumbai Riots: Why Justice Evaded Victims While Delhi, Gujarat Saw Convictions

Sajjan Kumar's conviction in Delhi shines a light on the Mumbai riot cases from 1992-93 that remain pending justice.

Shiv Sena mobs during the Bombay Riots of 1992-93.

(Photo courtesy: Allegra Labs) 

In a nondescript court in Mumbai, Maharashtra, the same scenario has been playing out over the last two years. The Sessions Case/0101171/2001 is called out; the accused line up, take a date, and leave. No proceedings have taken place in this case since February 2023. Witnesses come from far, but return without testifying.

The progress (or lack of it) in the case of State of Maharashtra vs Ram Deo Tyagi — easily one of the worst cases of police excess during the post-Babri Masjid demolition riots of 1992-93 —  is symbolic of the way these riot cases have been handled by successive Maharashtra governments.

A Sajjan Kumar could get life imprisonment for his role in the Delhi anti-Sikh pogrom that took place 40 years ago. The conviction is a semblance of justice, if not the real thing. But when it comes to punishing the perpetrators of communal crimes that took place in the country's financial capital 32 years back, the wheels of justice are grinding even slower. Hardly anyone has been punished in the Mumbai riots case.

This is because there is a key difference between Mumbai riots and India's two other major communal massacres – Delhi in 1984 and Gujarat in 2002. The victims in Delhi and Gujarat weren’t left to fend for themselves. Human rights groups, the National Human Rights Commission, religious organisations, and, most importantly, the media, all threw themselves into the hard and long struggle for justice.

That did not happen in Mumbai. This, despite these events having been examined by a sitting High Court judge whose report remains the most discussed inquiry report in recent history.

Srikrishna Report that Found Cops Guilty Ignored

When it came out in 1998, the BN Srikrishna Commission of Inquiry report into the 1992-93 Bombay riots kindled excitement among riot victims, especially those who had testified in front of the Commission.

Its recommendations were not just abstract homilies on communal harmony, but actionable points which the government could easily have implemented if it had the political will for it.

Strict action was recommended against 31 police personnel for their “extreme communal conduct." The Commission found that the police had closed 60 percent of the riot cases, despite complainants having identified the rioters in many of them and recommended they be re-opened. Finally, it recommended that families of those who went missing during the riots be compensated.

As expected, the then Shiv Sena government in Maharashtra rejected the report. It had, after all, held Sena chief Bal Thackeray responsible for the second phase of the violence. But what of the purportedly secular Congress?

The party showed no interest in the implementation of Justice Srikrishna’s recommendations during its tenure in the Opposition. Nor was it willing to act on the matter after it won the 1999 Assembly elections.

On the contrary, in the 15 years it was in power along with the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), Congress went out of its way to protect the indicted cops. Direct appeals made to the party president, Sonia Gandhi, proved fruitless. As did the requests sent later through members of her powerful National Advisory Council.

Justice Favoured the Accused

Whatever “actions” the government took in the name of implementing the report’s recommendations were indeed aimed at helping the accused.

Forced by the Supreme Court of India, which was hearing a petition urging implementation of the Srikrishna report, the government set up a Special Task Force (STF) in 2001 comprising hand-picked police officers to investigate the cases mentioned in the report. Of the 1,358 closed cases, the STF reopened just five. Even those ended in acquittal.

It was only after the then Chief Justice of India (CJI) AS Anand’s pointed questions on the action taken against RD Tyagi, senior-most of the 31 indicted cops, that the STF finally charged Tyagi and 17 of his associates with the murder of eight innocent Muslims during the Suleman Usman Bakery raid on 9 January 1993 (the case referred to above.)

By then, Tyagi had already retired from the post of Mumbai Police Commissioner. Not one of the 17 others ever spent so much as an hour in police custody. In fact, the Special Public Prosecutor (SPP) refused to oppose their bail applications, explaining to the court that the government didn’t want their “careers to suffer."

“He Has Suffered Enough"

The same script played out over and over. The Bombay High Court had ordered a CBI inquiry against Sub-Inspector Nikhil Kapse in December 2008 after the Srikrishna Commission found him responsible for shooting at namazis (Muslim devotees) inside the Hari Masjid, killing six on 10 January 1993.

The Maharashtra government rushed to the Supreme Court to stay the HC-ordered inquiry in 2009, citing that the accused had "suffered enough" and that he was only "executing his duty."

The STF exonerated Kapse without even talking to the victims. While the CBI did speak to the victims, it chose to disbelieve them and closed the case in 2011. Maharashtra government didn’t appeal, just as it hadn’t appealed against the discharge of RD Tyagi and nine of his co-accused cops in 2003.  In fact, it even facilitated his discharge, ensuring that the Special PP appointed to handle Tyagi’s case was kept out of the proceedings. In both cases, it was left to the individual victims to appeal, but to no avail.

In an interview after Sajjan Kumar’s conviction last week, HS Phoolka, the lawyer relentlessly pursuing Delhi’s 1984 offenders, spoke of the cover-up of those crimes by successive governments. Despite a decades-long fight, only about 50-60 offenders have been punished for the massacre of 2,736 Sikhs, he rued.

The conviction rate for the Mumbai riots cases is even lower. The only high profile accused to have been convicted is the late Shiv Sena leader Madhukar Sarpotdar, along with Sena functionaries Jaywant Parab and Ashok Shinde. The 2008 conviction — a first for any Shiv Sainik in a hate speech case —  was delivered by a special magistrate exclusively trying riot cases amid glaring police apathy. None of the accused, however, spent any time in custody.

The two special magistrates’ courts — where incidentally neither the magistrates nor the PPs were provided with copies of the Srikrishna Commission report — heard the riot cases and  handed down convictions in six out of 120 cases.

Disproportionate as it may be, this was the first time when Shiv Sainiks were actually punished for what they’d always done: targeting Muslims through words and actions. However, except for Sarpotdar and his co-accused, the rest were acquitted by the Sessions Court. 

Crime and (Unequal) Punishment

These special courts were set up in 2008, 15 years after the riots. Had such courts been set up immediately after the riots, more convictions could perhaps have been secured. Instead, Sharad Pawar as Chief Minister (CM) prioritised going after the culprits of the 12 March 1993 bomb blasts, in which Muslims were the accused and Hindus the victims.

When the harsh verdicts against the bomb blast accused – including death and life imprisonment – were pronounced in July 2007, the city’s dormant Muslim community aroused itself to ask: what about the riots that preceded the blasts? In a bid to silence them, then CM Vilasrao Deshmukh set up two special fast track courts to try riot cases for a limited span of three months. 

The setting up of these courts showed the power of public pressure. “If you want the Srikrishna report implemented, build up public pressure. Don’t expect the government to act on its own,” a Congress minister once told me.

He was right. Earlier too, it was public pressure that forced Home Minister Chhagan Bhujbal to appoint an SPP to oppose Tyagi’s anticipatory bail and regular bail applications. Left to himself, the ex-Shiv Sena leader would have let the applications go unchallenged.

There was a time when the courtroom would overflow with crowds when these bail applications were being heard. That was 2001, just three years after the Srikrishna report was tabled. By the time the last accused cop got bail, the courtroom had become despondent and empty. 

Disheartened by the State’s obvious bias towards the police officers charged with murder, the Muslim community eventually lost interest. In the years that followed, even victims whose complaints had been reopened gave up, crushed by the long legal process, the police eternally “persuading” them to “compromise”, and the lack of any support to rebuild their broken lives. Only a handful of activists, lawyers and a couple of victims kept trying to get the Srikrishna report implemented.

In Gujarat, the fact that the carnage was televised, gave a fillip to investigation in the cases of violence. In Mumbai, because a commission headed by a sitting judge was examining the riots, getting witnesses to testify before the Commission became the most important task. 

The Srikrishna report created a buzz in 1998 but the focus of activity eventually shifted to the courts again.

When the cases did reach the court, the government played its role — filing bulky affidavits that said nothing new, leaving crucial cases to regular PPs, not calling key eye-witnesses to testify, and so on.

Indeed, the pursuit of justice in the 1984 Delhi riots, the 1992-93 Mumbai riots, and the 2002 Gujarat riots makes one thing clear —  while it is difficult but possible to convict politicians, even the ones from the ruling party, for crimes in India, convicting a policeman is nearly impossible. They belong to a class of accused that every government wants to shield. 

Even the mainstream media showered sympathy on ex-Commissioner Tyagi when he was charge-sheeted. Senior police officers were interviewed to create the bogey of “demoralisation of the police force which was only doing its duty.’’ How exactly Tyagi and his men had “done their duty’’ during the riot, details of which were available in the Srikrishna report, has never been published.

From Delhi to Gujarat via Bombay

There was one more key similarity in 1984 Delhi and 2002 Gujarat riots. Both massacres could be politically exploited by the BJP and the Congress respectively.

In Mumbai, on the other hand, both the Congress — in power at the State and Centre when the riots took place — and the Shiv Sena, were held responsible by the report, which even indicted LK Advani for poisoning the communal atmosphere with his 1990 ‘Rath Yatra’.

Making noise about justice apparently served no one’s political interest in this case.

Finally, while Delhi and Gujarat were one-sided pogroms (Delhi more so than Gujarat), the Bombay riots saw both Hindus and Muslims being killed, though the numbers were disproportionate. At least 575 Muslims were allegedly killed as against 275 Hindus. Muslims were also the only ones targeted by the police in the aftermath of the violence. That is why the campaign for justice has always been focused on bringing the 31 police personnel indicted by the commission to book.

The trial of the cops accused of killing unarmed, peaceful citizens inside their homes has been left to languish for 22 long years. The yellowing, tattered, case file has passed from judge to judge, PP to PP — all equally unfamiliar with the case’s significance.

While Sajjan Kumar's conviction was a step in the right direction, for the victims it is perhaps too little too late. Scores of riot-affected families and kin of victims across cities in India continue to wait for justice. Like the families of those shot inside the Suleman Usman Bakery and the Hari Masjid in January 1993. Who even knows where they are today?

(Jyoti Punwani is a Mumbai-based journalist. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)