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The India-America bromance has disintegrated more rapidly than even the most pessimistic observers would have presaged.
On 28 July, US President Donald Trump imposed a 25 percent tariff on the import of Indian goods. The move came into effect from 7 August. Just a day later, Trump stunned India by imposing an additional, penal tariff of 25 percent on Indian imports. The total import tariff, effective from 27 August, is now 50 percent. Now, there are reports that India might be pushing back and rethinking business with the US.
You might be wondering how we ended up in this situation.
At the “Howdy Modi” event in Houston, 2019, President Trump described PM Modi as “one of America’s greatest, most devoted, and most loyal friends.” At the reciprocal “Namaste Trump” event in Ahmedabad in 2020, he declared, “America loves India, America respects India, and America will always be faithful and loyal friends to the Indian people.”
But a lower tariff for Southeast Asian countries like 19 percent for Pakistan and 20 percent for Bangladesh gave the first signal of geopolitical dissonance with India. India's all-weather friend, the UK, came out of the tariff ordeal somewhat shining with just a 10 percent tariff on its goods export to America. The US has imposed 15 percent for imports from the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and most other countries with whom the US has a trading relationship. China is at an interim tariff of 30 percent pending conclusion of negotiations. Syria, a close associate of both Iran and Russia, is facing the second highest tariff at 41 percent.
The US shares a long history of productive cooperation with India, starting with technical cooperation post India’s independence in agriculture and food aid to India in the mid-1960s, to American support in 2007 to by-pass the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions for accessing uranium for civilian purposes, and most recently, cooperation in space exploration between ISRO and NASA.
President Trump appears incensed at India’s non-cooperation in ending Russia’s revenue flow from oil export. The European Union boycotted the import of oil from Russia to force it to engage in peace negotiations with Ukraine. Trump backs this strategy and has taken it upon himself to force Russia to engage productively in the peace talks.
In 2024, the EU imported goods worth €35.9 billion from Russia and exported goods worth €31.6 billion, resulting in a flow of net revenue to Russia of €4.4 billion in 2024. Admittedly, this is much reduced from the net income accruing to Russia in 2022 (the year Ukraine conflict started) of €147.5 billion because of trade diversification away from Russia by EU.
A trifling benefit.
In comparison, Indian exports to Russia in 2024 were US$ 4.26 billion, while imports from Russia were US$ 61.4 billion. More than one half, or US$ 35.1 billion, were mineral fuels, oil, and distillates. The net trade revenue to Russia was US $57.1 billion.
In tandem, discounts on Russian oil also fell from US $12 to US$2 per barrel of oil. This has reduced the cost for India to switch from Russian oil to market purchase as earlier. Estimates of the price escalation in an Indian basket of imported oil sans Russian oil are within seven percent - not a crippling burden presently since global oil prices are lower.
Why would India court controversy and annoy a key ally like America, for such a trifling financial benefit? Not bowing to President Trump’s demands seems more a matter of principle and not an economic compulsion. India is signalling its strategic autonomy from all three – the Western Alliance, Russia, and China.
This aligns with India’s earlier stance, abstaining from a 2022 UNSC resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine and from two UNGA resolutions in 2025 calling on Russia to withdraw from Ukraine for the restoration of peace.
Most observers assume that President Trump is indulging his characteristic disdain of established decorum and order - another irreverent expression of American exceptionalism.
Could it be instead be that the prolonged, layered, negotiations might inadvertently have conveyed that India could accommodate pet Trumpian preoccupations? Like opening up Indian agriculture or automobile manufacture to imports - both much needed reform measures - in exchange for India maintaining its strategic autonomy, like in the purchase of Russian oil? Backtracking subsequently could explain the vengeful response.
On 8 August, news agency Reuters reported that India is slowing down purchase of US military equipment. India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, is already in Moscow, preparing for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India.
With Trump in retrograde, fast-forwarding the India-EU Free Trade Agreement is one option to revive the trade policy momentum and structure the path for future negotiations. Meanwhile, aligning oil purchase from Russia with market fundamentals and refinery demand would signal India’s continued commitment to peace and global integration in a rapidly disintegrating world .
(Sanjeev Ahluwalia is a distinguished fellow at the Chintan Research Foundation and was previously in the IAS and World Bank. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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