Does an Act of Terror Constitute 'Escalation'? Why India Says it Does

India is trying to shift the focus from the response to a terror attack to the attack itself, writes Vivek Katju.

In a direct response to the Pahalgam terror attack, the Indian Armed Forces launched Operation Sindoor in the early hours of Wednesday, 7 May, targeting nine terror-linked sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.

(Photo: Aroop Mishra/The Quint)

In diplomatic and strategic jargon, the word ‘escalation’ or the term ‘going up the escalatory ladder’ typically refers to an armed conflict between nuclear states spinning out of control and leading to the use of nuclear weapons.

In his 8 May media briefing on Operation Sindoor, India's Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said inter alia, “First of all, there is mention on all sides, of escalation. I think the first point that you have to keep in mind is the attack of 22 April in Pahalgam is the original escalation”. The significance of Misri making a connection between escalation and terrorism cannot be over emphasised.

Why?

The answer lies in the fact that this is the first occasion that India has clearly stressed that a terrorist attack by a nuclear state on another nuclear state constitutes the beginning of escalation.

India Must Keep up the Pressure

This writer will be forgiven by readers for recalling what he wrote in an important Indian newspaper on 28 June last year regarding the Reasi terrorist attack on 9 June, the day Narendra Modi took oath of office as Prime Minister for the third time.

This writer had noted, “After the Reasi attack, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar expressed the ambitious intention of finding a ‘solution to years-old cross-border terrorism’. He could begin the process of putting a curb on Pakistani terror by pointing out to the international community that the first step on an escalatory ladder between nuclear countries is the use of terror”.

This was not the first or only occasion that this writer had written that escalation begins with a terrorist act and not with a response by the victim state by responding to it through the use of its conventional forces to take kinetic action.

It is now vital that India pulls out all the stops on pressing the international community that Pakistan cannot be allowed to continue to keep the use of terror—or what is called in some sections of literature on strategic matters as ‘low-intensity warfare’—as a part of its strategic doctrine against India.

A sustained diplomatic campaign is necessary for this purpose because otherwise, once the current India-Pakistan hostilities come to an end—as they will sooner rather than later—the international community will heave a sigh of relief that a potential nuclear flashpoint has again been averted. And, it will consider it as yet another episode in the traditional enmity between India and Pakistan.

Tackling a Hostile State

As the world is preoccupied with dealing with the global political and economic disruptions caused by US President Donald Trump’s continuing actions, it will not be easy to keep the attention of the major powers on the terrorism issue. It is, therefore, necessary to link it to conceptual nuclear doctrine and give priority to it in all of India’s diplomatic interactions for the foreseeable future.

In these diplomatic exchanges, whether bilateral or multilateral, India should stress that it will always take resort to what Indian diplomacy should now have no hesitation in calling ‘The Modi Doctrine’.

The essence of the Doctrine is that India will use conventional kinetic force to respond to what it considers as an unacceptable terrorist attack from Pakistan. As part of fleshing out the doctrine, Indian diplomats and strategists would need to clarify that as a civilised and secular state, India rejected building up theologically or ideologically inspired violent groups as they exist in Pakistan.

It cannot be expected to simply absorb terrorism forever. Hence, it is necessary for the international community to take effective action against Pakistan to end the tanzeems like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e Mohammed.

Nuclear Deterrence is Not Nuclear Advantage

At this stage, it would be useful to recall the Cold War situation and Pakistan’s stand on the dangers of using conventional defence forces to counter a terrorist attack even if it emanated from a neighbouring terrorist state.

During the Cold War, the principal nuclear adversaries, the US and the Soviet Union, fought many proxy wars but in faraway places but never on each other’s territories. Two prominent examples of such wars are the Vietnam war of the 1960s and 1970s and the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s. The closest the two states to real nuclear tensions were during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the real anxieties caused by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) Able Archer 1987 exercise which was taking place in Europe. The Soviet leadership thought that the exercise could be a prelude to a nuclear strike. Once the NATO leaders realised this, the exercise was wound down. The US and Soviet proxies engaged in quasi conventional war, not outright terrorism as the Pakistani tanzeems have done for three and half decade.

Once Pakistan developed nuclear weapons, it turned the practice followed by nuclear states during and after the Cold War on its head as well. It considered that nuclear weapons provided it with a ‘shield’ to carry on terrorism.

To ensure that it could continue using the ‘shield’ to carry on with terrorism Pakistan urged the international community that any use of force by Indian defence forces against a terrorist attack would be escalatory in nature and could lead to a nuclear exchange between the two countries. The world powers accepted this and so did nuclear theorists.

For over two and a half decades, India was advised to be patient and not take kinetic action as it may escalate into a war with the attendant danger of nuclear exchanges. Hence, the focus all through this period was on the response to a terrorist attack and not the attack itself. India wants to reverse that now.

As I write these lines Pakistan is back to its old game of saying that Indian action under Operation Sindoor is leading to the possibility of nuclear war. 

A meeting of its Nuclear Command Authority is being convened to signal to the world that the situation is spiralling out of control. Pakistan is demanding that India should de-escalate. The important point that India has to reiterate to the international community, if it wants to pursue the doctrine established by Operation Sindoor, is that the dangers of escalation will not be on account of India, which has always acted with restraint and responsibility, but due to Pakistan’s use of terror. That is the challenge for Indian diplomacy.

(The writer is a former Secretary [West], Ministry of External Affairs. He can be reached @VivekKatju. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)