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Israelis have had a controversial track record of attacking nuclear facilities of nations deemed to be its enemies and on the supposed path of acquiring nuclear weapons, even if the said nation denies militaristic purpose for its nuclear program.
'Operation Opera' on 7 June 1981 was a daring attack by the Israeli Air Force that destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction. It established the 'Begin Doctrine' which laid out “a precedent for every future Government in Israel”. Lo and behold, 44 years later, the Israeli Air Force undertook 'Operation Rising Lion' to strike at three Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz, Khondab, and Khorramabad.
This unilateral Israeli action came despite the confirmation by Tulsi Gabbard, US Director of National Intelligence, that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and [Iran's] Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons program that he suspended in 2003”.
That Israel itself maintains “nuclear opacity” (Amimut in Hebrew) by neither accepting nor denying its own arsenal of nuclear weapons and has not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but is credibly estimated to have nearly 100 nuclear warheads is a hypocrisy of its own. It has chosen a policy of active deterrence against all others who could be like Israel.
However, sheer distance (therefore, logistical challenges) and the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear program is more India-focused, ensured that it was not similarly “hit” by Israelis, even though Pakistan has remained steadfastly “anti-Israel” in its posture.
Today, when Arab Sheikdoms are falling over themselves to ‘normalise’ relations with Israel (including Saudi Arabia which has remained engaged with Tel Aviv in secret parleys) – it is only the likes of the non-Arab states like Iran, Pakistan, or Afghanistan that have remained stridently opposed to Israel, even though their opposition tantamount to little impact on Israel, which is more concerned about its immediate neighbourhood.
That said, Israel has always held a special imagination in India’s ruling right-wing political party with which it shares majoritarian ethno-religious sensibilities, civilisational allusions, ideological-cultural similarities, nationalism predicated on religion, and a common adversarial perception that besets both sides. This has led to much admiration for the “Israeli ways” of handling situations (especially enemies) and has been subjected to much aspirational and valorising of Israeli tactics.
One particularly voluble chief minister from one of India's northeastern states commented on the “historic blunder” of India not doing a Israeli-type attack on Pakistan in the 1980s when it was midway in its nuclear program. He conveniently noted, “India’s tragic inaction during the 1980s remains a cautionary tale of what could have been – and what wasn’t."
Obviously, he remains silent on the fact that he was questioning a political party that he was a part of for the better part of his political career, and echoing the fascination with “Israeli ways”, since jumping political ships in 2014.
But the moot question remains, should (or could?) India have done an Israel? Would the subcontinent have been a safer place if India had indeed “hit” or facilitated a “hit” through a third party?
The fact is, Israel did draw an audacious plan to “hit” Pakistan’s Kahuta nuclear facility (principal nuclear enrichment site) in the early 1980s, with the purported use of Indian bases to refuel or launch the mission. India did not agree to the same, hence the plan never fructified. But there were good reasons for the same, as hindsight would validate.
Firstly, it is believed that unlike the Israeli attacks on Iraq or Iranian facilities, the plans on Pakistan were not so secret after all, as the US-CIA had already alerted the Pakistanis (who were major US-allies then, unlike Iraq or Iran). The US needed the Pakistani pivot in its Cold War with the Soviets in Afghanistan and held sway with the Israelis too, so the US reluctance was a major contributor.
Preemptively, the Pakistanis guaranteed full-war retaliation and both the US and the USSR (India’s ally then) were equally opposed to the brazen idea – India risked complete international isolation and sanctioning. The move was also militating against “no first use” stand of India, besides risking the moral weights of the Non-Aligned Movement's anchorage, then.
India’s energy security was at risk. More importantly, strikes on nuclear facilities are never conclusive (as simplistically assumed), as even with 200 Israeli fighter planes and the rain of drones striking the Iranian facilities right now, it isn't as if the Iranian nuclear program has been obliterated for good. Also, Israel had no diplomatic ties with India then, and that added to even more internal and external complexities.
The societal-political impact of such attacks are felt through generations. It is believed that the recent Israeli attack has unified the Iranian ruling elites and its vehemently opposed opposition parties, in a way not seen since the Iran-Iraq war of 80s.
Lastly, for all of Israel’s heroics and exceptional covert abilities, it has failed (for nearly eight decades) to guarantee peace and stability to its citizens.
No so-called “Iron Dome” has been able to protect it from either the ragtag raid by Hamas in 2023, or with retaliatory Iranian drones now.
If anything, the risk that an average Israeli citizen faces on the street, across the globe, has never been worse. Since 2015, Israel has had to face the ignominy of over half of country-specific UNHRC resolutions – something a country like India which seeks recognition and acceptance to become a major global power, cannot falter to.
That may just be political/partisan bluster and bravado to fuel testosteronal fervor among cadres, but is well short on reasonable understanding of India and its compulsions in the 80s, or even now. If anything, India has evolved its nuclear narrative towards a more aggressive, assertive, and yet aligned stance, that befits a major and moral power on its journey to become a major power.
(The author is a Former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)
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