India–China at 75: Why a Cold, Calculated Peace May be Only Way Forward

The deepest barrier to a reset may lie not in Beijing, but in Delhi, write Krishnan Srinivasan and Manoj Mohanka.

India China now stand at crossroads—where do we go from here?

(Photo: iStock/Altered by The Quint)

In a world increasingly defined by sharp power rivalries and economic decoupling, the idea of an India–China rapprochement appears, at best, faintly hopeful, and at worst, strategically naïve.

Yet, beneath the surface of scepticism, subtle shifts are underway. Direct flights have resumed. Border trade is cautiously reopening. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to visit Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit—his first trip to China since 2018.

The question is no longer whether engagement is desirable. It is when is it possible and on what terms.

The Weight of Grievances

For India, the list of grievances is long and unresolved: the border dispute; China’s political and military embrace of Pakistan; its refusal to recognise Jammu and Kashmir as Indian territory; the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor through PoK; stapled visas for Arunachal Pradesh residents; and repeated vetoes against India in global forums like the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Add to this the Galwan Clash of 2020 and an incomplete disengagement process, and the distrust is unmistakable.

From Beijing’s perspective, India’s positions on Tibet, the Dalai Lama, and the contentious border are provocations. Equally concerning is India’s growing closeness with Washington—especially via the Quad—and Delhi’s outright rejection of the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese officials also perceive the anti-China tenor of Indian politics and media as entrenched hostility.

And yet, India and China are too large, too proximate, and too economically enmeshed to treat confrontation as default. The logic of engagement—however cautious—remains.

The American Variable

Ironically, US behaviour has pushed India toward recalibration with China.

The Trump administration’s unilateral tariffs on Indian exports jolted Delhi into realising that even Washington—long seen as a “natural partner”—could pivot abruptly from partnership to protectionism. More recently, US pressure on India to reduce Russian oil imports, while continuing its own purchases, tested the limits of strategic autonomy.

In this context, a selective thaw with China serves two purposes: hedging against American unpredictability and preserving manoeuvring space for India’s independent diplomacy.

Any meaningful reset requires addressing the yawning economic imbalance. In 2024–25, the India–China trade deficit stood at $99.2 billion.

Delhi’s strategy must be twofold:

Expand exports in competitive sectors—pharmaceuticals, IT services, speciality chemicals, agriculture—while pressing for reciprocal Chinese market access and challenging non-tariff barriers.

Reframe policy on Chinese investment. Rather than blanket restrictions or liberalisation, India needs a sector-specific framework. Chinese capital and technology could accelerate India’s green energy transition, EV ecosystem, light manufacturing, and infrastructure and cordoned off from sensitive areas like telecoms and defence.

Structured industrial corridors or joint ventures, possibly via intermediaries such as Singapore or the UAE, to start with could pave the way to a politically acceptable pathway.

Simultaneously, India should continue leveraging the “China-plus-one” strategy, attracting firms diversifying supply chains beyond Beijing. The aim is not decoupling, but rebalancing—turning dependence into leverage.

The Quad Dilemma

A thaw with China raises questions for Washington: what happens to the Quad?

India has always been the most cautious member, resisting its militarisation or overtly anti-China framing. If relations with Beijing stabilise, Delhi will likely push for a softer Quad agenda—focusing on infrastructure, climate, and humanitarian cooperation.

This will likely disappoint Washington, which views India as central to its Indo-Pacific containment strategy. But America’s own inconsistency has helped drive India’s hedging. A modest reset with China, in fact, reinforces Delhi’s “multi-alignment”: refusing entrapment in any single camp.

Flashpoints Ahead

None of this should be mistaken for strategic convergence. Significant risks remain.

China’s dam-building on the Brahmaputra poses existential concerns for India’s long-term water security—arguably more destabilising than border clashes.

Should Beijing act unilaterally, Delhi would face the impossible balance of engagement alongside an ecological crisis. (Ironically, India’s own disputes with Bangladesh over shared rivers mirror this asymmetry—albeit with the roles reversed.)

Energy competition adds another flashpoint, as both countries chase resources in the Gulf and Africa. Economic rivalry increasingly intersects with geopolitical contestation. Flashpoints and friction will endure even if atmospherics improve.

A new domain of contention is technology governance. Beijing is lobbying for the creation of a World AI Cooperation Council, an initiative that will allow China to shape global standards on artificial intelligence. For India, the decision is delicate: rejecting the initiative risks ceding influence, but joining risks legitimising a Beijing-led framework that could sideline India and democratic safeguards.

Modi will be pushed to take a stance—balancing India’s ambition to be a digital power, its technological partnerships with the US and Europe, and its anathema, to be seen as part of a China-centred world order.

Historical Ghosts, Political Limits

The deepest barrier to a reset may lie not in Beijing, but in Delhi.

Galwan casts a shadow over Indian political memory, much like the 1962 war did for Nehru’s generation. Modi presides over a polity where anti-China sentiment runs deep, both in the public and strategic establishment. Having fuelled nationalist anger post-Galwan—through bans on Chinese apps, boycotts, and tough rhetoric—the government must now pivot without appearing weak or capitulating.

Should China mount another military move, Modi risks being at the receiving end of Nehru-like accusations of trusting an untrustworthy partner. The political costs are real and can potentially become huge.

Much also depends on Washington. A future US administration—Trump’s or otherwise—may again press India into an overt, anti-China posture. Delhi’s resistance to such instrumentalisation explains its preference for “multi-alignment”: engaging the US, Russia, China, and the Global South simultaneously and on its own terms.

This is not fence-sitting but strategic maturity. In a fractured and constantly changing global order, the art lies in keeping all channels open while retaining autonomy.

Interest Over Sentiment

Chanakya’s Arthashastra counselled the judicious use of conciliation, coercion, inducement, and discord. India today practises some of these—conciliating with China to hedge against U.S. unpredictability and standing firm at the Chinese border.

To put it into full play, India needs to deepen ties in Southeast Asia, and invest in regional partnerships to constrain Beijing’s periphery.

Lord Palmerston had observed, “Nations have no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.” As we have seen, alliances are transient and unreliable, and stability—even a “cold peace”, lacking warmth—is preferable to hostility.

An India–China reset may not be imminent. But building the scaffolding for one is not just desirable but necessary. It is necessary for the stability of Asia and the economic progress of two nations that together house a third of humanity.

Confucius’s wisdom bears reminding too, ‘without trust we cannot stand’—reinforcing the need to build confidence in each other going forward.

The timing is not without meaning: on 1 April 2025, India and China marked 75 years of diplomatic relations. That anniversary should serve less as a celebration of the past than a reminder of the unfinished business ahead—of the need to transform a fraught coexistence into at the very least a sustainable lasting peace ensuring growth and prosperity for both nations.

As Zhou Enlai famously quipped when asked about the French Revolution, it was “Too early to tell.” Seventy-five years into the India–China experiment, that verdict still holds true even as we gaze the crystal ball!

(Krishnan Srinivasan is a former foreign secretary and author of several fiction and non-fiction books. Manoj Mohanka is a businessman who serves on several corporate boards. This is an opinion piece and the view's expressed are the author's own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)