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As recession fears loom over the American economy like storm clouds gathering on the horizon, one key question arises: why would a nation with unmatched economic strength deliberately steer its own way towards troubled waters?
The answer to this lies not in any economic urgency, but in some profound misunderstanding of modern monetary operations.
When Donald Trump took office, surrounded by America's financial elite, nobody could have predicted that those same individual billionaires would go on to lose more than $209 billion in less than two months.
According to a Goldman Sachs analysis, the probability of an economic downturn and a recession in the United States has risen to 30 percent, as businesses freeze investments and consumers tighten their belts in preparation for tougher times.
At the heart of this economic meltdown is a perilous myth of the United States: that a sovereign nation which prints its own money, must somehow "balance its books" like a household budget. This fundamental misunderstanding has resulted in a cascade of erroneous policies, with tariffs emerging as the administration's preferred weapon in a battle it does not need to fight.
As we stand at this crossroads, we must grapple with an uncomfortable truth: financial difficulties in America arise not out of insufficient revenue or unfavourable balances of trade, but from a failure to understand modern monetary systems. Reductions in the national debt through restrictive trade reflect an outdated economic foundation that benefits neither businesses nor citizens.
If a recession comes, it will not be the result of inevitable economic cycles or external pressure but rather, a testament to what happens when economic policymakers try to govern their activities according to myths about the economy rather, than the realities of their monetary conditions.
If we do not recognise that a nation with monetary sovereignty plays by fundamentally different rules than those without it, we may lose the very ground earned in prosperity by the sacrifice of orthodoxy.
One of the most perilous economic myths influencing global macroeconomic and trade policy today is that governments have to balance their budgets like families. This profoundly mistaken analogy has driven ill-conceived austerity policies, rationalised irresponsible economic nationalism, and warped our understanding of national debt.
While families and companies need to balance budgets and pay off debts to avoid insolvency, a sovereign nation that prints its own money operates under a completely different set of rules. Unlike househoulds, the US government can never "run out of money" in the conventional sense.
In a fiat system, the federal government does not have to raise taxes before it spends. Rather, it spends first and taxes subsequently to manage demand, curb inflation and maintain the value of its currency. This is more than a mere technicality; it is a conceptual change in how we are supposed to think about public finance.
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) exposes the flaws in the conventional wisdom that deficits are inherently dangerous. The true limit on government spending isn’t a debt ceiling or deficit target but the economy’s productive capacity. If government spending outpaces that capacity, inflation becomes a concern.
This is not because the nation is “out of money,” but because too much demand is chasing too few goods. This is a far cry from the simplistic narrative that excessive national debt leads to bankruptcy.
Contrast this with a government surplus, where spending is cut and more money is pulled out of the economy than is put in. Surpluses may sound fiscally responsible but in reality, they drain financial resources from the private sector leading to slower growth which causes job losses and further economic stagnation.
Taxes in this framework take on an entirely different role. Rather than serving as a funding mechanism they act as a tool to control inflation which reduce inequality and incentivise productive economic activity.
The debate about debt is no longer one of deficit scare mongering, but a strategic conversation about government spending's optimal role in economic and social objectives. Still, conventional politics holds on to the old household budget analogy, which imposes artificial limits that harm more than they help.
This same flawed reasoning underpins Trump’s trade war. His tariffs are not the product of a wider industrial strategy or carefully crafted economic vision—they are, as The Wall Street Journal points out, simply "dumb." His tariffs are indiscriminate, hitting friends and foes alike, and that too without any industrial policy basis to support them. They are intended to send a message of toughness, not to serve any actual economic purpose.
The actual challenge here is not punishing foreign competitors or paying off debt, but harnessing the tools available to us and creating a dynamic resilient economy that works for all.
Trump's tariff push is not only a negotiating strategy; it is a conviction he has clung on for decades. In the 1980s, he demanded tariffs on Japan, arguing that Japan's rise would leave the US behind in the economic race to supremacy. This protectionist reflex has largely been consistent even in the present global economy, where the effects of such policies are even more damaging.
In contrast to previous trade wars, contemporary supply chains and financial markets are delicate, and the US economy itself is still recovering from the pandemic.
At the same time, Trump is a sharp, clever, and shrewd political strategist, who understands how economic uncertainty affects voter sentiment. With inflation rising, growth is projected to further slow down by 1.9 percent in 2025 and 2026, and markets are reacting accordingly.
However, in doing so, he overlooks a crucial economic reality. Forcing the US into a balance of payments surplus could have devastating consequences for both the domestic and global economy. A balance of payments surplus might seem like a sign of economic strength, but history suggests otherwise. Whenever the US has moved toward a surplus, disruptions have followed. The Interest Equalisation Tax from 1963 to 1974 was meant to curb capital outflows but ended up distorting financial markets.
More recently, in 2025, a surge in gold imports pushed the US trade deficit to $131.4 billion, triggering recession fears and causing GDP growth forecasts to plummet from 2.8 percent to (-)1.6 percent, according to The Financial Times.
If Trump’s policies were to push the US into a balance of payments surplus, it would shrink dollars liquidity which would tighten global financial markets.
The US dollar is the world’s reserve currency, and reducing its availability would make borrowing more expensive for countries relying on dollar-denominated trade and investment. Global trade would slow, emerging economies would struggle with rising debt costs, and weakened investments would cause ripple effects, destabilising financial systems worldwide.
Trump’s unwavering commitment to tariffs, combined with his precarious political standing, makes the economic outlook even more uncertain.
Although he has long seen protectionism as a means of making the US strong, today's economy is vastly different from that of the late 1980s. Whether he continues to nudge the US towards slowdowns driven by tired trade phobias or shifts to prevent a balance of payments crisis is yet to be decided.
His choices in the next few months will not only shape America's economic destiny but also influence the stability of the global financial system—making this one of the most consequential economic gambles in recent history.
(The author is a Professor of Economics, Dean, IDEAS, Office of Inter-Disciplinary Studies, and Director of Centre for New Economics Studies (CNES), OP Jindal Global University. He is a Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics, and a 2024 Fall Academic Visitor to the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Oxford. This is an opinion piece. The views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for them.)
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