China Expands Missile Defence with Kunming Radar: What It Means for India

LPARs are an integral part of China’s missile warning — and can provide early-warning of any incoming missile.

LPARs are an integral part of China’s missile warning and space tracking network — and can provide early-warning of any incoming ballistic missile, track missile trajectory(s), help extrapolate likely impact points, and track satellites and other space objects.

(Photo: Aroop Mishra/The Quint)

China has recently activated a new Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) at Kunming in Yunnan province. Kunming is about 430 km east of the Sino-Myanmar border, and about 1,200 km from the eastern edge of the Bay of Bengal.

LPARs are an integral part of China’s missile warning and space tracking network — and can provide early-warning of any incoming ballistic missile, track missile trajectory(s), help extrapolate likely impact points, and track satellites and other space objects.

In tasking and operational responsibility, China’s LPARs are quite akin to the US’s PAVE PAWS (Phased Array Warning System).

The facility at Kunming is China’s eighth known LPAR station.

A Strategic Network of LPARs Across China

In January, after the US tested an intercontinental ballistic missile, the Chinese state media had published pictures of its LPAR at Jiamusi in its northeastern province of Heilongjiang.

Besides Kunming and Jiamusi, China has:

• In China’s Hebei Province near Beijing completed in 1980s (this is China’s first and oldest LPAR, and is probably non-operational

• At Jinan, just west of the Shandong Peninsula; operationalised in 2013

• In Jiangsu Province (north of Shanghai); operationalised in 2022

• At Zhejiang (southwest of Shanghai); operationalised in 2014

• In Gansu province, central China; completed in 2018

• At Korla, in northwestern Xinjiang Province; completed in 2009

It not only supports China’s missile testing from sites in Xinjiang and Tibet but is also used intended for early warning of missile launches from India and Russia.

The LPARs are not standalone platforms, but are part of China’s broader, integrated, overlapping missile detection and space surveillance system — and function in conjunction with a number of other facilities which are strategically interspersed across China, such as the Data Reception Centres, Deep Space Tracking Network, Satellite Control Centres, Space Launch Sites, and Telemetry Tracking & Control Centres. Additionally, there are operational linkages to China’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) units. 

However, with many nuclear-warhead-tipped ballistic missiles incorporating technologies like Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV), Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle, decoys, and with the introduction of hypersonic platforms, BMD/ABM systems are no longer a sure defence.

Hence, it does seem that the LPARs are primarily orientated towards garnering early warning of a missile attack and launching a response. The Pentagon’s Report to Congress on China’s Military Power of 2024 assesses that China’s LPARs likely support the country's implementation of the early warning counterstrike nuclear posture of ‘Launch on Warning’.

The fact that most LPARs are located contiguous to China’s missile forces (in the form of the missile brigades grouped under bases) also suggests that the LPARs may primarily be used for defining China’s response to any adversarial missile attack. Notably, the Kunming LPAR, which has 5,000-km range, has three missile brigades around it as part of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s 53 Base.

Korla also has three missile brigades around it, Heilongjiang has two, Zhejiang has two, and Shandong has one missile brigade near it. This fits in with China’s declared nuclear policy of ‘No First Use’ (NFU). Stated first in 1964 – “Not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances" – China reiterated that NFU pledge in April 1995 in its publicly submitted National Statement on Security Assurances to the United Nations, in 2009, in 2015, and in its 2023 national defence policy.

Earlier, most LPARs and associated facilities were under the PLA’s Second Artillery Force (China’s strategic rocket force). However, in 2015, China reorganised the PLA and established the PLA Strategic Support Force.

 The latter has two departments:

• The Space Systems Department (SSD), which is responsible for space operations, including early warning, space situational awareness, mission control, space-based communications, and space-object tracking; and

• The Network System Department, which is responsible for cyber and some electronic warfare operations.

The LPARs and associated facilities function under the SSD, particularly its Base-37.

Global Reach and Focus on Indo-Pacific Region

The Kunming LPAR, with its 5,000 km detection swath, is not focused solely on China’s immediate neighbours but extends as far as Bahrain (the headquarters of the US’s Fifth Fleet), up to Diego Garcia (US’s military base in southern Indian Ocean), and to south of the First Island Chain till Darwin in Australia.

It is part of a broader strategic response to the US and its allies, with a clear focus on balancing power in the Indo-Pacific region. 

This is evident from three dynamics:

• China’s focus on ‘Great Power’ equivalence and rivalry with the US

• The US-China asymmetry in nuclear warheads — as of date, China is assessed to possesses about 500 nuclear warheads, whereas the USA has a missile inventory of 5,177 nuclear warheads (1,770 deployed, 1,930 held in reserve and 1,477 retired warheads awaiting dismantlement)

• The deployment concentration of the PLA Army and PLA Air Force on China’s east and southern coasts

Impact on India’s Strategic Defence

That said the Kunming LPAR impacts India significantly.

The Bay of Bengal, given its average depth, is quite ideal for operations of Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) (i.e., nuclear warhead tipped ballistic missile carrying nuclear-powered submarines).

India presently has two SSBNs – Arihant and Arighat – with more, featuring better submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), on the way.

India is also developing a new naval facility, INS Varsha, at Rambilli (near Vishakpatnam), as a SSBN base, which reportedly will have subterranean pens for the SSBNs to enter while submerged.

While the Kunming LPAR cannot detect Indian SSBNs when they slip away from this base, it will be able to pick up any SLBMs launched by any of our SSBNs particularly as part of a counter/second-strike. This dynamic remains applicable to the present as well as the future, including when India fields its more advanced SSBNs (e.g., the S5, with a 6,000 km range-MIRV-ed K-6 SLBM).

The Kunming LPAR, about 1,600 km away from the Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island off Odisha’s coast, gets a clear look at India’s east-coast-based space launch and missile testing complex.  

Furthermore, since LPARs can track satellites, they can also provide accurate data for targeting satellites with anti-satellite weapons and/or degrading them through electronic warfare or directed energy weapons. Reports indicate that the Korla LPAR was utilised during China’s trials of anti-satellite weapons and hypersonic platforms.

Notably, the US, Russia, and China are currently the only countries that have developed and deployed such long-range radars for early warning against incoming ballistic missiles.

The Pentagon’s Report adds that China's “defence industry and universities are developing quantum imaging, navigation, and radar applications to enhance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities”.

India, with no dearth of challenges, has a finite budget and technological base. Hence, it needs to find innovative, achievable ways to ensure its strategic capabilities remain relevant and in play.

(Kuldip Singh is a retired Brigadier from the Indian Army. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)