India Dialled Israel, Waited 9 Days For Iran: Decoding India's Diplomacy

Experts suggest it is essential for India to maintain good relations with Iran despite its age-old ties with Israel.

Sakshat Chandok
World
Published:
<div class="paragraphs"><p>Experts suggest that PM Modi's decision to hold off on a call with his Iranian counterpart was based on domestic politics rather than India's own foreign policy pertaining to the Israel-Iran rivalry.</p></div>
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Experts suggest that PM Modi's decision to hold off on a call with his Iranian counterpart was based on domestic politics rather than India's own foreign policy pertaining to the Israel-Iran rivalry.

(Photo: Vibhushita Singh/The Quint)

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Following Israel's sudden strikes against Iran on 13 June, Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke to his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu, during which he "shared India's concern and emphasised the need for early restoration of peace". However, he did not speak to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian for several days after the conflict broke out.

Following the outbreak of the conflict, while External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar had spoken to his Iranian counterpart Abbas Aragachi and "urged avoidance of any escalatory steps", talks at the highest level between India and Iran took place much later.

Taking to X on Sunday, 22 June, nine days after Israeli strikes against Iran, PM Modi said that he "expressed deep concern" during a phone call with Pezeshkian, but did not offer a condemnation of Israel's aggression.

Even as the conflict has now been temporarily halted by a US-brokered ceasefire, which was announced by US President Donald Trump on Tuesday, 24 June, experts who The Quint spoke to highlight two key takeaways about India's diplomatic approach in the wake of the conflict.

One, that PM Modi's decision to hold off on a call with his Iranian counterpart was based on domestic politics rather than India's own foreign policy pertaining to the Israel-Iran rivalry.

Two, India was "missing" amid as there was little to no initiative shown by New Delhi to help broker peace or make its stand known unambiguously.

"I feel bad to say this, having spent 40 years in diplomacy, but when such serious events are taking place which have long-term implications for India's interests, New Delhi is a missing party in the whole scenario."
Talmiz Ahmad, former Indian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE

India Caught in Crossfire Between Global Player & Domestic Politics

Writing for The Quint, Lt Gen Bhopinder Singh (Retd) recently observed, "Israel has always held a special imagination in India’s ruling right-wing political party [Bharatiya Janata Party] with which it shares majoritarian ethno-religious sensibilities, civilisational allusions, ideological-cultural similarities, nationalism predicated on religion, and a common adversarial perception that besets both sides."

"Therefore, India remains amongst the few nations not to condemn Israeli attack on Iran (even though Delhi has civilisational, cultural, and strategic alignment with Tehran)," he added.

Former Ambassador Talmiz Ahmad made a similar argument, alleging that one of the most grievous faults of the Indian government is that they have had a "harsh communal view" of international relations. "But foreign policies are not made on the basis of one's religious identity," he asserted.

Even as India rescued its citizens under Operation Sidhu, Ahmad noted that India did not make its position clear. "For us, it seems that the most important thing is the Bihar election, followed by Kerala and then elsewhere," he added.

"The Indian government has decided that the priorities are all at home. And to the extent that we need to be abroad, it is only to enhance the persona of the prime minister... otherwise there's no interest."
Talmiz Ahmad

Omair Anas, a professor of international relations at the Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University in Turkey, agreed with him. He said that in the initial days of the war, India's response to Israeli aggression against Iran was "quite muted".

"PM Modi spoke to the Israeli prime minister, but not his Iranian counterpart when war broke out. Now he has spoken to Pezeshkian after one-and-a-half weeks. This was bound to not send a good message," he said.

"However," Anas added, "As far as domestic politics goes, the BJP indeed benefitted from the Indian government's reaction to the conflict."

Where Does the US Fit in

As the Iran-Israel conflict played out, another irritant for South Block was Trump's invitation to Pakistan's Army Chief Asim Munir for lunch at the White House on 18 June.

The lunch, and the meeting that followed, signaled a warming of ties between the US and Pakistan, especially given the fact that it came days after the India-Pakistan conflict in May and the fiasco over Trump's claims of having mediated a ceasefire between the two countries.

Not only was Pakistan far more receptive to Trump's claims than India, which reiterated its position that a peace deal was secured due to DGMO-level talks, but Islamabad also named Trump for a Nobel Prize for his alleged role in ending the conflict between India and Pakistan.

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As opposed to the speculation that Trump's meeting with Munir was in regard to the India-Pakistan conflict, experts suggest that it actually had to do with the instability in West Asia due to the Israel-Iran war.

"We have never had a situation where the US president has had lunch with a Pakistani general," Ahmad says.

"Why did Trump call Munir? Whenever the US tries to get closer to Pakistan, they do so to invest in the longer term. The Americans are trying to reaffirm the same control they had over West Asia in the early years of the Cold War. And Pakistan is a crucial factor in this situation as it has a border with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Iran."
Talmiz Ahmad

This isn't the first time the US has made overtures to Pakistan. In a number of instances in the past, when West Asia had been in shambles due to regional conflicts, the US had made attempts to fortify its relationship with Islamabad so that it can use the country's territory or influence to maintain its own hegemony – much to the peril of India.

When the then Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the US covertly supported Afghan rebels, or the Mujahideen, by arming and training them, and funneling their resources through Pakistan's territory. Similar overtures were made during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and following the 9/11 attacks, when the US provided billions in military aid to Pakistan in return for intelligence, logistical support, and airspace access.

"It makes ample sense for the US to draw closer to Islamabad and use it as a launching ground for eventual war, if it comes to that," West Asia expert and journalist Sanjay Kapoor told The Quint, adding, "Pakistan would make a strategic ally for the US as Iran and Pakistan share a land border cutting across Balochistan."

Why India Needs To Maintain Equidistance From Both Iran & Israel

Apart from the prospects of continued oil imports, there are a number of other reasons as well which make it essential for India to maintain good relations with Iran, despite its longstanding ties with Israel.

In May 2024, India and Iran inked an agreement for the former to operate one of the two terminals of the strategic Chabahar Port, which has given New Delhi unimpeded access to trade with land-locked Afghanistan and Central Asian republics: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.

If relations were to turn sour with Iran, India would have to depend overwhelmingly on Pakistan for trade with Central Asia – a compromise New Delhi is simply not willing to make.

Moreover, Tehran has consistently supported New Delhi on a number of contentions issues. For instance, despite the anti-India stance taken by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) regarding the sovereign status of Jammu and Kashmir, Iran is one of the few Islamic countries which has consistently supported India's policies in the erstwhile state.

However, the reason that India cannot overwhelmingly express its support to Iran and condemn Israeli aggression – as was evident in New Delhi's tempered response to the crisis – is that Tel Aviv still remains one of India's closest geopolitical and defence partners.

Israel is the second largest defence supplier to India, just after Russia, and a major investor in India's energy sector, research and development and other significant areas.

Further, ever since India developed diplomatic relations with Israel, annual trade between the two countries has risen from $200 million in 1992 to over $10.8 billion in 2022-23. However, due to Israel-Hamas tensions and Israel's actions in Gaza, trade with Israel has tumbled down to $3.75 billion in 2024-25, according to Ministry of External Affairs data.

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