More MPs, Less Accountability? Rethinking Delimitation in India

Parliament needs institutional reforms to strengthen accountability and uphold democratic governance in India

A Parliament’s strength lies not in its size, but in its ability to hold power accountable.

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A Parliament’s strength lies not in its size, but in its ability to hold power accountable. Any expansion unaccompanied by institutional reform may risk weakening—not strengthening—democratic governance in India.

The constitutional principle of "one person, one vote, and one value“ is treated as ideal, but very few political systems have implemented it in its purest form, and many consciously choose not to.

In the US, each state elects two senators regardless of population. While the House of Representatives is population-based, presidential elections are determined through the Electoral College.

Similarly, the European Parliament follows a model of degressive proportionality, where member-states are allocated between a minimum of six and a maximum of 96 seats, balancing representation.

The Indian Constitutional Framework

• Article 81(2) of the Constitution mandates that seats in the Lok Sabha be allocated so that the population-to-seat ratio is uniform across the states as practicable.

• Article 82 and Article 170(3) of the Constitution require periodic readjustment of the Lok Sabha Parliament seats and state legislative constituencies after each Census.

Early delimitation exercises in 1952, 1963, and 1973 adhered to this principle until 1976. Then, the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution froze the total number of Lok Sabha and Assembly seats based on the 1971 Census.

In 2001, the 84th Amendment of the Constitution extended the freeze on seats but allowed readjustment of Parliament seats and constituencies within states based on the 2001 census.

The objective was to ensure that states implementing population control measures were not penalised with reduced representation.

Despite multiple extensions, population growth among states remains unresolved.

According to the Economic Survey projection, southern states continue to show a further decline in population growth compared to northern states, where Bihar and Uttar Pradesh account for 40 percent of the population increase.

The defeat of the 131st Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2026 along with its companion Delimitation Bill, 2026, and Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, has drawn renewed attention to delimitation and to seeking a long-term, permanent solution.

That necessitates a great national consultation exploring alternative approaches, not unilateral decision-making. One such proposal is to strengthen state legislative Assemblies, making them more proportionate to the population, as a more effective avenue for representation, while keeping Parliament seats unchanged as they focus on national policy and oversight.

Persistent issues such as parliamentary disruptions, absenteeism, and limited days of functioning raise doubts about whether increasing the number of representatives would improve accountability and guarantee better representation.

The Hidden Cost of Delimitation Without Reforms

Any expansion of Parliament's strength without extending session days and Question Hours will dilute democratic participation.

Article 85 of the Constitution mandates that the Houses of Parliament shall be summoned to meet at least twice every year, with no more than six months' gap between consecutive sessions.

During the first two decades of Parliament, the Lok Sabha met for an average of more than 120 days a year.

Today, that figure has fallen to approximately 70 days and in recent terms, closer to 55. The Standing Committee on Parliamentary Affairs has cited growing parliamentary workload as the reason for this decline.

The MPs' performance in Parliament is largely graded on attendance and participation, which includes Question Hour engagement, Private Member Bills, motions, and debates, yet access to most of these mechanisms depends on a ballot lottery, making their "performance" a statistical chance.

Question Hour operates from 11 AM to noon every day of Parliament in session. There are two types of questions:

• Unstarred Questions: 230 answered in writing every working day during a session

• Starred Questions: 20 selected for oral answers by ministers on the floor of the House

Assuming there is no change to the council of ministers' strength and daily submission rate of questions, the probability of an MP getting Starred Questions answered will be:

Formula current = (20/250)* (230/483) = 3.81 percent.

Formula  proposed = (20/250)* (230/790) = 2.33 percent.

*Probability over time calculated using probability of at least one success: P=1−(1−p)n

where P = Probability of success in a single day; and n =number of days in session.

Similarly, the probability of an MP getting Unstarred Questions answered will be:

Formula current = (230/483) = 47.6 percent.

Formula proposed = (230/790) = 29.1 percent.

The probability draws interesting observations by expanding MPs' both Starred and Unstarred question probabilities drop by exactly 38.8 percent, directly proportional to the increase in eligible MPs from 483 to 790.

(Dheeraj Pola is an NRI living in the US, and a Senior Solution Architect by profession. This is an opinion piece, and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)